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ABSTRACT
Perceiving Justice and Locating Causality:
The Effects of Outcome Valence, Perspective, and Privilegedness
(May, 1977)
Richard Paul Mack, B.S., University of Pittsburgh
M.S., University of Massachusetts
Ph.D.
,
University of Massachusetts
Directed by; Professor George Levinger
The purpose of this study was to examine different questions
related to the notion that people are perceived as typically getting
what they deserve. More specifically, respondents were asked to
estimate the likelihood that people receive deserved (just) and un-
deserved (unjust) outcomes. It was also examined whether these esti-
mates were affected by the desirableness of the outcome (desirable
vs undesirable), the perspective of the respondents (oneself as the
recipient vs^ someone else as the recipient) , and the privilegedness
of the respondents (students from two exclusive colleges vs disad-
vantaged people of Hispanic origin).
Three hypotheses were considered: the just world, self-
serving, and hedonistic justice hypotheses. The just world hypothesis
predicts that only the deservingness of the outcijme will effect the
estimates made by the respondents. The self-serving hypothesis pre-
dicts that both the desirableness and to whom the outcomes happen
influence the likelihood estimates. Finally, the hedonistic justice
iv
hypothesis contends that the deservingness of the outcome, its desir-
ableness, and to ^om it happens, all have an effect on the estimates
made by the respondents.
The data were collected by questionnaires. In addition to
the likelihood estimates of the various types of outcomes indicated
above, a second section of the questionnaire obtained measures of
causal attributions. These attribution measures indicate the degree
to which respondents perceive outcomes as being caused by the recipient
himself or by some external agent.
In general, the results demonstrate that people are perceived
as more often getting what they deserve than not getting what they
deserve, regardless of whether the outcomes are desirable or undesir-
able. Females report themselves as more likely than others to get
what they deserve, while males do not differ across perspectives.
Although both the privileged and underprivileged respondents do not
differ on their estimates of the occurrence of deserved outcomes, the
underprivileged respondents report undeserved outcomes as more likely
to occur than do privileged respondents. In general, causal attribu-
tions were more often made to personal than to environmental sources.
Finally, those respondents that perceive people as highly likely to
get what they deserve are more likely to make personal attributions of
causality than respondents who perceive people as less likely getting
what they deserve.
It was concluded that neither the just world, self-serving,
nor hedonistic justice hypotheses could readily account for the re-
sults. Instead, it was suggested that people may be motivated to
V
perceive control over their outcomes, rather than motivated to per-
ceive their outcomes as necessarily deserved or desirable. Also,
discussed are sex differences, deservingness as a moral and psycho-
logical issue, and possible ways to improve upon the present study.
Vl
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Justice and injustice are of personal importance to the lives
of all people, everyday, and not only to those who occupy legal,
political, or philosopher roles. Issues of justice and injustice are
debated on the streets, at work, in the courts and on the floor of the
Senate. The concern is whether or not people get what they deserve;
do considerate people have their considerations returned or are they
taken advantage of and abused? Does the hard worker receive his due
promotion or is he passed by because the boss has a nephew who needs
employment?
It seems obvious that our perceptions of the world as a just
or unjust place should have an impact upon the way we think, the
feelings we experience, and how we interact with those around us.
Thus, perceptions of the world as a just or unjust place may effect
not only the private experiences of the individual, but also the
public arena of interpersonal relations. Before addressing specific
issues, however, let us define what we mean by justice and injustice
from a social psychological perspective.
Working Definitions of Perceived Justice and Injustice
In its most general form, perceived justice refers to a situa-
tion when an individual is perceived as getting what he deserves and/
or deserving of what he gets (cf. Lerner, 1970). Injustice
,
then, is
represented by a situation when the individual is perceived as not
getting what he deserves and/or not deserving of what he gets.
According to these definitions, it is important to note that
just and unjust outcomes are not merely represented by positive and
negative consequences respectively. That is, positive outcomes are
not always just and negative outcomes are not always unjust. In order
for an outcome to be classified as either just or unjust one must con-
sider the context within which that outcome occurs; the context being
the "input" associated with the outcome. Figure 1 specifies two
general conditions of perceived justice and injustice.
This figure indicates that when a person's input is favorably
evaluated (e.g., one's "kindness") and the outcome received by that
person is positive (e.g., another's "gratitude"), the situation is
perceived as just. Likewise, an unfavorably evaluated input (e.g.,
one's "unkindness") associated with a negative outcome (e.g., another's
"resentment") is also perceived as just. In contrast, injustice is
perceived when the evaluation of the input is favorable (e.g., "kind-
ness") but the outcome is negative (e.g., "resentment") or when the
input is unfavorably evaluated (e.g., "unkindness") but the outcome is
positive (e.g., "gratitude").
In the present paper, a just outcome is defined as one in which
the person is perceived as getting what he deserves and/or deserving of
what he gets—an appropriate alignment between the input and the out-
come. On the other hand, an unjust outcome is defined as one in which
the person is perceived as not getting what he deserves and/or not
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Figure 1. Conditions defining perceived
justice and injustice
4deserving of ,*at he gets-an Inappropria^ alignment between the
input and the outcome."'"
Statement of the Problem
It is contended that social psychology has examined perceived
justice from a narrow, and perhaps over-simplified perspective. Sys-
tematic theorizing about perceived justice has been largely limited
to research situations involving (a) injustice , with (b) negative out-
comes, (c) for some other person, as perceived by an outside observer
.
Conspicuously little attention has been given to situations that are
(a) just, (b) have positive outcomes, or which (c) happen to oneself
.
It is felt that by examining a larger variety of situations a
more accurate assessment of current theorizing can be made. Further,
an appreciation for the potential complexities involved in perceiving
justice and injustice should become more salient.
In the present study eight types of situations are explored by
varying (a) the Justness of the situation (just or unjust outcomes);
Cb) the Valence of the situation (positive or negative outcomes); and
(c) the Perspective on the situation (actor or observer) (see Figure 2).
"Justness" here refers to the deservingness of the outcome. "Valence"
pertains to the desirability of the outcomes. Finally, "Perspective"
describes the viewer's point of reference; either looking at one's
own situation (the actor's perspective), or at someone else's situa-
tion (the observer's perspective).
Two samples are also compared in the present study. One sample
consists of college students, which, for the most part, represent a
p
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Figure 2. Eight types of justice-relevant situations
6relatively privileged sector of the American population. The other
sample consists of members of a disadvantaged minority group which has
not typically enjoyed the same privileges as the college students.
This comparison is a check on previous research which had employed
almost exclusively college students (cf. Rubin and Peplau, 1975).
Finally, the relationship between perceiving justice and
making attributions of responsibility is examined. In spite of the
fact that these two processes seem tied together (see Chapter II),
little if any systematic work has been done on this relationship.
To summarize, the theorizing on perceived justice seems to take
too irarrow a viewpoint. The present research systematically manip-
ulates the Justness, Valence, and Perspective of situations; hope-^
fully providing a more comprehensive analysis of perceived justice.
Two samples are compared to examine the generalizability of social
psychological theorizing, as well as the possibility of previous
results being an artifact of the sample employed. Finally, the
relationship between perceiving justice and perceiving responsibility
is esramined.
7CHAPTER II
PERCEIVED JUSTICE: A CRITICAL REVIEW
This chapter critically reviews the literature on perceived
justice. In the review both theoretical and empirical literatures
are discussed. The theoretical positions are stated, their pertinent
research reviewed, and their limitations highlighted.
The "Just World" Hypothesis
Do people believe they live in a "just world" or an "unjust
world?" In other words, do people believe they usually get what they
deserve, or do they believe they are recipients of arbitrary and
change outcomes? Lerner (1965, 1970, 1974, and 1975) and his associ-
ates (Lemer & Simmons, 1966; Lerner & Matthews, 1967; and Simmons &
Lemer, 1968) have attempted to answer these types of questions.
From their work, they have proposed that people have a "need" to be-
lieve in a "just world." Lerner (1970) suggests:
We want to believe we live in a world where people get what
they deserve or, rather deserve what they get. We want to
believe that good things happen to good people and serious
suffering comes only to bad people. In the same vein, we
want to believe that people who work hard will get what they
deserve, what they have earned and worked for . . . if . . .
[unjust] things can happen, what is the use of struggling,
planning, and working to build a secure future for oneself
and family? No matter how strongly our belief in an essen-
tially just world is threatened by such incidents, most of
us try to maintain it in order to continue facing the irri-
tations and struggles of daily life. This is a belief we
cannot afford to give up if we are to continue to function
(p. 207).
How does this "need" develop? Accor^g to Lerner (1971).
children are socialized to develop
-personal ::ntracts - to forego s.all
Wdiate gratifications for larger ones at a :uture ti.e. This will-
ingness to delay, however,
.ust be based on r:. belief the individual
will indeed eventually receive the larger gratifications. That is. in
order for the "personal contract" to be viabl-:. the individual
.ust
come to believe that people get what they des.rve. Since an adult's
life presuinably requires many incidents of delaying gratifications, it
becomes important to believe that people get v.at they deserve.
To perceive an "unjust world" is thre.-.ening. By perceiving
the outcomes that othersreceive as deserved,
-..ere is a "consensual
validation" of one's own belief that the worlf is indeed a "just" place.
Thus, when confronted with an instance of inj_3tice, and the opport-
unity to restore "actual" justice is not available, the individual
is motivated to cognitively distort the situation to at least perceive
it as just. This distortion process results - people being perceived
as getting what they deserve (i.e., an appropriate alignment of inputs
and outcomes)
.
By holding" the belief in a "just worli," people provide a pre-
dictable quality to their lives. There is a s-se of security in
knowing that what one deserves, one is likely - receive. Such a
belief also implies that people have some contr:! over their fates.
Through correct actions people receive desired cutcomes, and for having
good intentions they are rewarded. Similarly, incorrect actions result
in failure, and those with unkind intentions s.ffer for their iniquity.
9Evidence supporting the "-j ust world" hvnorhp.-f. j^^es the
research indicate that outcomes are typically perceived as deserved?
Do people distort their perceptions in order to perceive inputs and
outcomes as appropriately aligned? Are the "just world" predictions
true under certain conditions but not true under others? Attempts
will be made to answer these and similar types of questions throughout
this chapter.
In order for inputs and outcomes to be perceived as approp-
riately aligned, the "just world" (JW) hypothesis predicts that
recipients of positive outcomes should be evaluated more favorably
than recipients of negative outcomes. Lerner (1965) had subjects
observe two people working on a joint task. These observers were
informed that one of the two "workers" had been arbitrarily selected
to be paid money, while the other worker would get nothing. The
observers were also told the "workers" were unaware of any payments.
In spite of the arbitrary assignment (i.e., neither necessarily deserved
their outcomes) of who would be paid, the observers rated the paid
worker as more creative and as exerting greater effort on the task
than the unpaid worker.
Other research has shown that when observers were unable to
alter the undeserved-negative outcomes of victims, those victims were
derogated (Lerner & Simmons, 1966). This derogation of victims occurred
even- when the observers themselves had previously been treated unjustly
(Simmons & Lerner, 1968). Lincoln and Levinger (1972) demonstrated
that when observers believed they could improve the fate of a victim.
10
the victim's rating was enhanced. But again, when observers believed
they could not improve the victim's fate, devaluation of the victim
occurred.
The perceived alignment of inputs and outcomes is achieved not
only by enhancing and devaluing recipients of positive and negative
outcomes respectively, but also by attributing behavioral antecedants
as Inputs. According to Lerner (1975, p. 5) . . people can 'deserve'
outcomes in at least two ways: by what they do—their behavior—or by
who they are— their personal attributes." Lerner and Matthews (1967)
found that when observers were provided with a behavioral explanation
for the victim's misfortune, there was no devaluation of the victim's
character. In other words, with the behavioral cause available, the
situation was already perceived as just (i.e., the outcome was already
aligned with the behavioral input) and there was no need to seek a
characterological explanation for the outcome the victim received.
Accidents are threatening situations; they are laden with
uncertainty and unpredictability. To reduce threats of unpredictibility,
and to perceive inputs and outcomes as aligned, the JW hypothesis
suggests that accident victims should be perceived as responsible for
their misfortunes. Walster (1966) found that victims of accidents were
often held as responsible for what happened to them. Furthermore, in
her study, she found a tendency to assign more responsibility as the
severity of the accident's outcome increased. Shaver (1970) failed to
find more responsibility with "severe" that with "mild" accidental out-
comes, but consistent with cultural expectations, older victims were
perceived as more responsible than younger victims. Walster's (1966)
resoilts, however, were replicated by Phares and Wilson (1972). These
authors reported greater attributions of responsibility with "severe-
accidents than with "mild" accidents, and, reasonably enough, more
responsibility was assigned when the person was clearly the cause of
the accident that when the situation was ambiguously described.
To summarize, the research reported in this section appears to
support the proposition that individuals tend to perceive people as
deserving what they get. That is, characterological and behavioral
inputs were aligned with the recipient's outcomes. The above research,
however, represents only one of several types of situations. With the
exception of one study (Lerner, 1965), the above situations had
observers responding with respect to others who were the recipients of
negative outcomes. Several Important questions remain. Would we find
comparable results if the others were recipients of positive rather
than negative outcomes? What if oneself was the recipient? Would
people align their own inputs with their own outcomes? Would this
alignment take place for negative as well as positive outcomes? The
next section addresses itself to these questions.
Evidence inconsistent with the "just world" hypothesis
. The
literature shows inconsistent results when observers view others re-
ceiving undeserved-positive outcomes. Recall, Lerner (1965) reported
that observers rated the paid worker as more creative and exerting
more effort on the task than the unpaid worker. Thus, both workers
were perceived as getting what they deserved. A study by Shaw and
12
Skolnick (1971), however, found different results. Their study
indicated that observers of accidents involving positive outcomes
for the recipients were less likely to attribute responsibility for
those positive outcomes, than were observers of accidents involving
negative outcomes. Apsler and Friedman (1975) found that only a
minority (20%) of their observer-subjects rated fortuitously rewarded
people higher than nonrewarded people.
These results indicate that observers align inputs with out-
comes when the outcomes are negative, but not when they are positive.
The possibility therefore exists that the observers are not attempting
to perceive the situations as just. Perhaps the attributions are a
direct result of the outcome's valence (positive vs. negative) and not
due to considerations of deservingness. So far it is possible the
results "supporting" the JW hypothesis may have occurred because unjust
outcomes and negative outcomes were confounded.
Do people align their own inputs and outcomes in the same way
they do for others? This takes us into the perspective issue; are there
actor-observer differences in perceiving outcomes as just and deserved?
According to the JW hypothesis, individuals prefer to see people
receive outcomes that are just. This is assumed to be true whether
oneself or some other is the recipient. Lerner and Simmons (1966, p.
203) have argued: "To maintain the belief that there is an appropriate
fit between effort and outcome, the person must construe this as a
relatively 'objective' belief—that applies to everyone ..." Lerner
(1971) elsewhere writes
13
If the person becomes aware that someone else-who lives inand IS "vulnerable" to the same environment-hal receivedundeserved suffering or failed to get what he dLe™theissue must arxse as to whether the person himself can rustthe environment. The value of his "personal contract" be!comes questionable. Obviously, then, if it is to hL ad-
Zu^^^ II
maintain his contract he will be motivated to
whiJn H 't"'^ ^""^^^^ environment in
(p 8)!
^^^^ corresponds to what he deserves
In other words, by believing the world is just for other people, sup-
port is provided for believing it is also just for oneself. Therefore,
in order to maintain the belief that people get what they deserve,
both actors and observers should make attempts at perceiving align-
ments between the inputs and outcomes of people.
Two areas of research render questionable the prediction that
actors align inputs and outcomes in an attempt to perceive their out-
comes as deserved. The first area is represented by research using
"quasi-actors "; that is, observers which approach the actor's perspec-
tive such that the victim's outcomes are in some way relevant to the
observer. The second area involves situations where the person him-
self (i.e., the actor) is the direct recipient of the outcome.
Generally, "quasi-actors" do not align inputs with outcomes
for recipients of undesirable outcomes. Shaver (1970) found that when
subjects role played the positions of accident victims, they assigned
less responsibility and recommended more leniency than when they did
not assume that role. Aderman et el. (19 7A) gave instructions to
subjects which either "induced empathy," "inhibited empathy," or
directed their attention to the "emotional cues" of a victim who
14
received an undeserved-negative outcome (the
-emotional cues" instruc-
tions were those employed in most of Lemer's research. These re-
searchers found that the "inhibiting" and "emotion" instructions
resulted in a devaluation of the victim. In contrast, the "empathy-
instructions resulted in the observers (i.e., quasi-actors due to their
"empathy" instructions) enhancing the evaluation of the victim. If it
can be assumed that the "empathy" instructions induced the subjects to
take the recipient's perspective, it appears that actors~at least
"quasi-actors"- may not make attributions in the same manner as observers.
Perhaps in the above two studies the instructions implicitly
"told" the subjects how to respond. A study by Chaiken and Darley
(1973), however, is less vulnerable to such a demand characteristic cri-
ticism. These experimenters had two subjects observe two experimental
confederates working together on a task. On this task each worker had
a particular role. Toward the end of the task an "accident" occurred
which presumably had negative consequences for one of the two co-
workers. The subjects were then informed the^^ were also going to work
on this task together, and were assigned to one of the two roles they
had previously observed. Before going to do the task the subjects were
asked questions, some of which were pertinent to the cause of the
"accident." The results showed that subjects who were assigned to the
victim's role did not devalue the "victim," but rather assigned respon-
sibility to the "perpetrator." In contrast, subjects assigned to the
"perpetrator's" role blamed the victim. The results from Shaver's
(1970), Aderman et al. 's (1974), and Chaiken and Barley's (1973) studies
15
in-
suggest that the hypothesis is not a good predictor vhen the
justice done to the victi. is in so.e way involving tc
-.he observer.
Clearly, the most involved condition is the aczor's perspective;
that is, to be the direct recipient of the outcome. l. is to that
research we now direct the discussion.
Research employing the actor's perspective prc-;^des little
evidence that recipients of negative outcomes perceive themselves as
responsible for those outcomes. In the first of two studies. Apsler
(1972) found that subjects who were "randomly assigned ' to an un-
pleasant psychological test showed more antagonism toward the psychol-
ogy department's policy of experimentation than subjects who were
assigned to a less unpleasant task. In his second stucv, participants
in the military draft lottery who received numbers that indicated they
were likeT^ to be drafted reported greater antagonism toward the
policy of conscription than those who were unlikely to be drafted.
The results from both these studies may be interpreted to indicate
that actors blame sources other than themselves for their own mis-
fortunes
.
Rubin and Peplau (1973), using the same draft lottery partici-
pants as Apsler (1972). attempted to test the notion that actors who
strongly believed in a "just world" (High JWs) would be zore likely to
devalue themselves after receiving an undesirable draft lottery number
than those who believed less strongly in a "just world" ,Low JWs).
Their results showed recipients of undesirable draft lottery numbers
held themselves in lower regard (i.e.. lowered self-este£t:) than
16
were no
ir mis-
recipients of desirable lottery numbers. However, High JWs
""^ """''^
" ^^"^ seu-estee. than Low JWs after the
fortunes. The authors suggest their results may simply Indicate a
"spillover Of affecf such that people who are happy generally feel
good about themselves and those who are unhappy generally feel bad
about themselves.
So far our review has examined quasi-actor and actor perspec-
tives with respect to negative outcomes. Let us now turn to situations
involving positive ou:comes. Streufert and Streufert (1969) found that
team members assumed credit for success by attributing their good
fortune to decisions
.ade by their team rather than to "chance" factors
or "characteristics of the environment." It seems, then, that actors
with positive outcomes do align their inputs with their outcomes. These
results are consistent with the JT7 hypothesis. Less direct support
comes from Rubin and Peolau's (1973) study. Recall, they found that
draft lottery participants who received favorable numbers had an
increase in self-esteez: (i.e., self-enhancement). As previously noted,
however, these authors suggested the increase in self-esteem may simply
reflect a "spillover of affect."
What does the literature review to this point indicate? Can
any general statements be made? First, the JW hypothesis does not
invariably receive support; that is, individuals did not consistently
perceive people as getting what they deserved. We found that inputs
and outcomes were perceived as aligned when observers viewed others
receive negative outcomes (e.g., Lemer & Simmons, 1966; Lerner &
17
Matthews. 1967; Simmons & Lemer, 1968; Walster, 1966; and Phares &
Wilson. 1972). and when actors themselves were recipients of positive
outcomes (e.g.. Streufert & Streufert. 1969; and Rubin & Peplau, 1975)
On the other hand, inputs and outcomes were not perceived as aligned
when observers reacted to others who received positive outcomes (e.g.,
Shaw & Skolnick. 1971; and Apsler & Friedman, 1975) and when quasi-
actors and actors received negative outcomes (e.g., Shaver, 1970;
Aderman et al.
.
1974; Chaiken & Darley, 1973; and Apsler, 1972).
These results suggest a self-serving motive rather than a
justice motive. That is, observers see others as causing their own
misfortunes but not their good fortunes, while actors assume respon-
sibility for their good but not their bad outcomes. Obviously, the
JW hypothesis fares best in research situations upon which it was
developed—observers viewing others receive negative outcomes. It
seems necessary, however, to turn elsewhere to seek an adequate explan-
ation when all data is considered. One candidate is a self-serving
hypothesis.
The Self-Serving Hypothesis
The Self-Serving hypothesis, like the "Just World" hypothesis
is motivational in nature. The bases for the motivations, however,
differ for the two positions. According to the JW hypothesis, there
is a motive to perceive people as getting what they deserve; such that
favorable intentions and actions are rewarded and unfavorable ones
punished. In contrast, the Self-Serving (SS) hypothesis proposes
18
that individuals are motivated to perceive themselves
, regardless of
their perspective, as highly likely to be recipients of desirable out-
comes and unlikely to be recipients of undesirable ones. Although
several writers have discussed self-serving processes (e.g., Helder,
1958; Walster, 1966), Shaver (1970) provides a synopsis of these
processes
:
.
. .
when a situation has "affective significance" for rh.perceiver, the resultant attribution wil! depend on he a^sof the sxtuatxon and on the perceiver^s own Wishes! A pf?-cexver faced with what other would consider a unif;nnly nega-tive appraxsal of his character or abilities will a'ributethe failxng not to himself-as would objective observeJs--
J^^it^d'to^r' • • • r-l^---g attribSuL are]limited to circumstances in which some aspect of the per-ceiver 's character~his blameworthiness or his self!es?eem-is threatened. It can also exist when there is a threat tophysical safety. When confronted by a physically threaten-ing situation the perceiver's defensive [i.e., seff-::^:Lg]
fL^^K^ ""if ^ distortion of the probabilitythat he could be injured (p. 112)
ciuxxx
Both the JW and SS hypotheses predict that attributional errors
are often made by attributors. albeit for different reasons. According
to the JW hypothesis they are made in order to perceive the world as
a just place. For the SS hypothesis, they are made to maximize the
perceived likelihood that desirable things will happen to oneself and
minimize the perceived likelihood that undesirable things will happen.
Another major distinction between the JW and SS hypotheses
involves one's Perspective on the situation. People are assumed to be
self-serving and not other
-serving. Actors and observers should,
therefore, respond differently to situations depending on the Valence
of the outcomes. Such predictions and data supporting the SS hypo-
thesis will now be reviewed. The reader should note that the SS hypo-
thesis accounts for results which the JW hypothesis fails to predict.
19
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Evidence supporting the self-serving hvpothP,..|.., in this sect
we will examine the four types of situations previously reviewed: (1)
observers responding with respect to recipients of negative outcomes;
(2) observers responding with respect to recipients of positive out-
comes; (3) quasi-actors and actors with respect to their own negative
outcomes; and (4) quasi-actors and actors with respect to their own
positive outcomes. For each type of situation the prediction of the
SS hypothesis will be made followed by supportive research.
Self-serving observers are motivated to minimize the perceived
likelihood that they themselves could be recipients of undesirable
outcomes. To do so, they should perceive victims of negative outcomes
as in some way causing their own misfortunes, and not causal sources
(e.g., environmental factors) which could also affect the observer's
own fate. Clearly, observers devalue (Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lemer &
Matthews, 1967; and Simmons & Lerner, 1968) and attribute responsi-
bility (Walster, 1966; and Phares & Wilson, 1972) to recipients of
negative outcomes.
The second type of situation involves observers responding to
recipients of desirable outcomes. Self-serving observers are motivated
to maximize the perceived likelihood that they themselves will receive
desirable outcomes. This can be accomplished by attributing causality
for those desirable outcomes to environmental sources. By doing so
those outcomes may also be perceived as likely to occur for oneself.
If observers were to perceive the other's positive outcomes as solely
due to the other's inputs (i.e., his personal characteristics or actions).
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it would decrease the perceived likelihood that oneself as an observer
would be the recipient of those outcomes.
Agalxt, research previously cited is consistent with the above
prediction. Shaw and Skolnick (1971) found that observers made more
environmental attributions when outcomes for others were positive than
when they were negative. Apsler and Friedman (1975) reported that only
20% of their observers rated arbitrarily rewarded recipients' perform-
ances as superior to those who were not rewarded. In other words, 80%
of their observers attributed responsibility to "chance" or "other
reasons" when the outcomes were positive. Clearly, the reactions of
observers to both the desirable and undesirable fates of others are
consistent with the predictions from the SS hypothesis.
Is this hypothesis predictive when oneself is the recipient of
the outcome? Let us now turn to an examination of the actor's perspec-
tive. A self-serving actor wants to minimize the perceived likelihood
of undesirable outcomes. Therefore, whenever he is the recipient of a
negative outcome, causal attributions should be made which minimize the
perceived likelihood of that negative outcome recurring. If the indiv-
idual were to consider himself as responsible for his negative out-
comes it would not be self-serving. That is, perceiving oneself as
typically the cause for one's own misfortunes suggests they would be
perceived as likely to recur. If the actor were to attribute respon-
sibility to environmental sources, however, he should decrease the
perceived likelihood of negative outcomes recurring relative to the
perceived likelihood of their recurrance if oneself were regarded as
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the cause. It is predicted, then, that actors will tend to make
environmental attributions (i.e., not perceive inputs and outcomes
aligned) whenever they are recipients of negative outcomes.
Research previously cited supports this prediction. Not only
do actors deny self-responsibility when the outcomes are negative
(e.g., Apsler, 1972) but observers who are induced to approach the
actor's perspective (i.e., quasi-actors) avoid assigning responsibUity
to the recipient (e.g.. Shaver, 1970; Chaiken & Darley, 1973; and
Aderman et al.
,
1974).
The last situation to be examined involves actors receiving
positive outcomes. Self-serving actors want to maximize the perceived
likelihood that positive outcomes will recur. By attributing respon-
sibility to themselves for their desirable outcomes, actors support
the perception that the positive outcomes will be likely to recur. On
the other hand, by attributing the outcomes to an environmental causal
source, one should decrease the perception they will recur. Generally,
then, by attributing responsibility to oneself, the actor is increasing
the perceived likelihood of positive outcomes relative to their
perceived likelihood if the environment was regarded as the cause.
Therefore, actors should assume personal responsibility when their
outcomes are desirable. Indeed, Streufert and Streufert (1969) found
team members attributed more responsibility to themsleves than to
"chance factors" when their teams were successful.
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Although there Is considerable support tor the predictions o,
the SS hypothesis, there are results which see. to he Inconsistent „Uh
We will briefly review that research In the next section.
^^^^^^=^^^-^^^^2=2^^^^^^^^^^
contrary
to predictions tro» the SS hypothesis. Feather and Sl.on (1971) found
that actors attributed both success and failure to external causes,
rather than the predicted self-attributions with positive outco.es and
environmental attributions whenever the outco.es were negative. Bec^n
(1973) reported that teachers accepted
.ore responsibility for their
students' failure (presu.ably a failure for themselves) than for their
students- successes. Lastly, Apsler and Friedman (1975) failed to find
actor-observer differences. About 20% of their actors and observers
rated the "performances" and "personal characteristics" of rewarded
recipients as superior to those who were not rewarded. The remaining
80% of actors and observers both attributed the outcomes to "chance" or
"other reasons."
To summarize, the SS hypothesis fares much better than the JW
hypothesis. It accounts better for data involving both positive or
negative outcomes from either the actor or the observer perspective.
In contrast, the JW hypothesis accounts only for observers viewing
recipients of negative outcomes and actors themselves receiving positive
outcomes.
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CHAPTER III
THE HEDONISTIC JUSTICE HYPOTHESIS
The data reviewed in the previous chapter were, for the most
part, more consistent with the Self-Serving than the "Just World"
Hypothesis. Nevertheless, it is contended by the present writer that
people entertain motives of deservingness as well as self-servingness.
This chapter proposes a synthesis of a justice motive and a self-serving
motive.
Limitations of Previous Research
The literature reviewed in Chapter II indicated that the kinds
of results obtained depended upon who the recipient of the outcome was
(actor or observer) and the valence of those outcomes (positive or
negative). Although this literature was primarily concerned with the
issue of perceived justice, it is interesting to note that the justness
of outcomes were not clearly manipulated in that literature. For the
most part, subjects were presented with situations which could be con-
strued as involving undeserved outcomes. For example, they were
exposed to situations where the outcomes were due to lottery drawings
(Apsler, 1972; and Rubin & Peplau, 1973), "chance" factors (Lerner,
1965; and Lerner & Simmons, 1966), or accidents (Walster, 1966; Phares &
Wilson, 1972; and Aderman et al., 1974).
Nowhere in the literature reviewed were subjects presented
situations that clearly had inputs and outcomes appropriately aligned.
In other words, subjects were not presented situations which were
clearly just. This absence of just situations in the literature is
most likely a result of the dependent varlahl.. employed. The unjust
situations used in the research were ambiguous; that is, the input was
left unspecified, and it was the subject's task to provide it by
making evaluations of, or attributions to, the recipient and/or the
environment. In the case of just situations this is difficult to do
because the inputs and outcomes have to be clearly specified in those
situations presented to the subjects. Obviously, such situations
almost "demand" that the subjects' attributions merely reflect the
information given in the manipulations. Indeed, Kelley (1971a) has
noted that events must be sufficiently ambiguous for perceivers to make
their own interpretations.
Later in this paper a dependent variable is suggested which
provides the opportunity to examine situations involving both just and
unjust outcomes.
The Hedonistic Justice Hypothesis
This hypothesis is based upon the belief that people attend to
both the outcome's deservingness and its valence. Thus, the Hedonistic
Justice (HJ) hypothesis adopts selected assumptions from the JW and the
SS hypotheses. Additional assumptions must be made, however, which
provide connecting links between those assumptions from these two
hypotheses
.
The HJ hypothesis maintains that perceptions are directionally
biased by the individual's motives. More specifically, it is assumed
that (1) overall, people are motivated to perceive outcomes as deserved
rather than undeserved; (2) overall, they are also motivated to
perceive people as having a higher likelihood of positive than negative
outcomes; and (3) deserved outcomes and positive outcomes are of
greater importance for oneself than for other people.
Additional assumptions must be made, however, which specify the
relationships between those assumptions listed above. Thus, the fourth
assumption is that the motive toward maximizing the perceived likeli-
hood of positive outcomes and minimizing the perceived likelihood of
negative outcomes takes precedence ovpr the motive to perceive people as
getting what they deserve. In other words, the desirability of an
outcome has more significance to the individual than its deservingness
.
For example, regardless of the individual's perspective he would be
motivated to perceive an unjust-positive outcome over a just-negative
one.
The fifth and final assumption may seem contradictory to the
first assumption. However, it should be noted that it is conditional
on the outcome's valence and the respondent's perspective. It is
assumed that in certain circumstances (depending upon the valence of
the outcome and the respondent's perspective) individuals may be
motivated to perceive injustice over justice . Let us briefly review
these "special" circumstances.
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The first case is represented by actors who are recipients of
negative outco.es. Obviously it is to the actor's advantage not to
perceive himself as the cause of his misfortunes. Actors should, there-
fore, perceive unjust-negative outco.es as more likely than just-negative
ones. The second case where injustice should be perceived as more
likely than justice is when observers view others who are recipients of
positive outcomes. If the other's positive outcomes are perceived as
undeserved and environmentally caused, it increases the likelihood that
oneself may also be the receipient of such outcomes. Therefore,
observers should perceive unjust-positive outcomes as more likely than
just-positive ones.
Briefly, the HY hypothesis maintains that people are generally
motivated to perceive justice as more likely than injustice and positive
outcomes as more likely than negative ones. Further, justice and
positive outcomes are generally more important for oneself than for
other people. Also, the valence of outcomes are more important than
the deservingness of those outcomes. Lastly, under specific circum-
stances (see above), people are motivated to perceive undeserved
outcomes as more likely than deserved ones.
Supporting research; A pilot study
. It was previously
mentioned that the literature lacks situations where just outcomes had
been manipulated by the researcher. This absence, it was suggested,
was most likely an artifact of the dependent variables that had been
used. In order to examine just outcomes, a pilot study was performed
which employed a dependent variable that could readily be applied in
both just and unjust situations, from either an actor's or observer's
perspective. More specifically, respondents in either actor or
observer perspectives were asked the Perceive^Llkellhood that just and
unjust outcomes occurred.
Method. Undergraduate residents of a coed dormitory were given
questionnaires. The ten items in the questionnaire were selected from
Rubin and Peplau's (1975) Just World Scale. Five items represented
just situations and five represented unjust situations.
Half of the respondents were given the "actor" version of the
questionnaire. This version instructed the people to respond to the
itmes with respect to themselves and also had the items worded in the
first person singular. The other half of the respondents had "observer'
versions. In this version the people were instructed to respond with
respect to other people, and the items were reworded by replacing "I"
with "people".
The Perceived Likelihood measures were obtained by having the
respondents rate each items on a 6-point scale as to whether that item
was "generally true" or "generally untrue". This measure indicated the
Perceived Likelihood that the events described by the items were
believed to occur.
The general procedure involved putting the questionnaires in
the mailboxes of all the residents of the dormitory. At least thirty
"actor" and thirty "observer" questionnaires were distributed. After
the questionnaires were completed, they were returned to a box in the
Head of Residence office. The questionnaires were collected one week
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after they were distributed.
Results and Discission. Fifteen "actor" and 15 "observer-
questionnaires were returned; however, the highest scoring individual
from each of these groups was eliMnated because of their marked devia-
tion from the other scores. Thus, the statistical analysis was based
upon 14 respondents from each of the Perspectives.
A one-between and one-within mixed design analysis of variance
was used for tests of significance. The between subjects variable was
the respondent's Perspective (actor vs. observer) and the within subject
variable was the Justness of the items (just vs. unjust). The results
demonstrated that, overall, just events were perceived as more likely
than unjust events (F^^^e = ^'^S, P < -01). There was also a trend
for just outcomes to be perceived as more likely for oneself than for
others, and unjust outcomes as more likely for others than for oneself
^^1,26 2.90, p. < .10). These results are consistent with the HJ
hypothesis—first, people perceived justice as more likely than injus-
tice, and second, just outcomes tend to be perceived as more likely for
oneself than for others.
Unfortunately the valence of the outcomes were not systematically
manipulated in this pilot study. It was, therefore, impossible to
examine the other predictions of the HJ hypothesis. Nevertheless, this
pilot has demonstrated two important things: (1) the HJ hypothesis is
a viable predictor; and (2) the Perceived Likelihood Measure provides
a way for examining not only unjust outcomes but also just ones.
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In the next chapter, predictions from the JW, SS, and HJ
hypotheses will be made with respect to the Perceived Likelihood
measure. Thus, we will have a direct comparison of these three hypo-
theses in a single study, based upon the same measure. Before doing so,
however, let us briefly review one more issue: the perceptions of
justice by privileged and underprivileged people.
Do Privileged and Underpriviledged People Differ in their Perceptions?
Do both privileged and underpriviledged individuals perceive the
world as a place where people typically get what they deserve? The
results demonstrating the tendency to perceive outcomes as just, have
for the most part been obtained from a relatively privileged group of
people—college students. Perhaps the socio-economic backgrounds of
this group provided life experiences which corresponded relatively
closely to the belief that people get what they deserve. Material
resources were generally available to reward them when they exhibited
those traits and actions deemed deserving. Perhaps, their parents, with
sufficient opportunities and concern with child rearing, withheld
rewards or administered punishment when the traits and actions displayed
were unfavorable. Further, socializing agencies outside of the home,
such as schools and the entertainment media, presented a picture of a
"just world." In other words, these people came from environments where
the "personal contract" was viable.
Could we expect less fortunate people, such as members of an
underprivileged minority groups, to have similar perceptions? Within
such a group, material rewards were perhaps less available, and the
frustrations of poverty, unemployment, discrimination, and insecurity
may have interfered with concentrated attention to the appropriation of
due rewards and punishments. Also, environmental norms may have
encouraged immediate rather than delayed gratifications-if a resource
is scarce, take it when you can get it!
Briefly, differences in life experiences may result in priv-
ileged and underprivileged people perceiving different degrees of
justice. Although individual differences have been demonstrated,
results comparing college and noncollege subjects have been equivocal
(cf. Rubin & Peplau, 1975).
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CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENTAL PREDICTIONS
This chapter outlines the predictions from the Just World. Self-
Serving, and Hedonistic Justice Hypotheses. These predictions are made
with respect to two measures: (1) the "Perceived Likelihood" that certain
types of events occur; and (2) the attributed "Locus of Causality" for
outcomes the people receive. Before stating the specific predictions,
however, some comment on the distinctions between, and the purposes of,
these two measures seems necessary.
^^^ Perceived Likelihood measure indicates the extent to which
people are perceived as getting what they deserve (justice) or not
getting what they deserve (injustice). These measures examine people's
perceptions that positive or negative inputs are aligned (or not aligned)
with positive or negative outcomes. There is no necessary causality in
the Perceived Likelihood items; they merely indicate whether the inputs
and outcomes are, or are not, aligned. The purpose of these items is
to measure the respondent's estimate that various types of events occur.
The Locus of Causality measure indicates the perceived "reasons"
for, or causal sources of, outcomes. In a sense, the respondents are
asked to provide the inputs given certain outcomes. These inputs (or
causal sources) can be either personal (i.e., due to the person) or
environmental (i.e., due to reasons other than the person).
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Predictions from the Just World HypotheSIS
In this section we will briefly outline some assumptions and
predictions from the Just World hypothesis. The predictions are made
first with respect to the Perceived Likelihood measures, and then the
Locus of Causality measures.
Perceived likelihood measure. The JW hypothesis maintains that
people are motivated to perceive the world as a just place. As a result,
cognitive activities are directed toward perceiving people as getting
what they deserve.
Therefore, just events should be perceived as more likely than
unjust events (J > U) . ~
Justice and injustice can involve either positive or negative
outcomes. The JW hypothesis, however, maintains the primary motivation
lies in perceiving outcomes as deserved and not in perceiving them as
necessarily positive or negative.
Therefore, the perceived likelihoods of positive and negative
outcomes are not expected to differ (P = N)
.
There is no motivation postulated toward perceiving deserved and
undeserved outcomes as being necessarily positive or negative; but that
justice, in general, is perceived as more likely than injustice in general,
c. Therefore, both just-positive and just-negative events
should be perceived as more likely than unjust-positive and
unjust-negative ones (JP = JN > UP = UN)
.
Further, this hypothesis maintains that individuals are motivated
to perceive other people as also living in a "just world." Such percep-
tions support the belief that oneself is living in a just world.
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d. Therefore, both ^rtnr. .r.A observers should perrPivp iustevents as more likely than unin^^ T^^^^TTTrfiry^T-^^
^
For both actor and observer perspectives the primary motivation
is to perceive outcomes as deserved and not necessarily as positive or
negative.
e. Therefore, the perceived, likeU of positive and negative
outcomes_^houl^^
and obi^v'iTlDer'^^^
spectives (PA = PO = NA = NO) .~
~~
' ^
and
f. Just-positive and just-npp^^fi.re events should be perceived
as more likely than uniust-posltive_andJ]^jn_^t^j^^^
events from either perspective (JPA = JNA = JPO = JNO >
UPA = UNA = UPO = UNO)
.
Locus of causality measures. According to the JW hypothesis
individuals are motivated to perceive people as getting what they deserve,
One method of doing this (as previously reviewed) is to perceive people
as responsible for the outcomes they receive. On the other hand,
environmentally caused outcomes are not necessarily perceived as
deserved.
Therefore, actors and observers in situations involving
either positive or negative outcomes should show a
strong tendency to make personal rather than environ-
mental attributions of causality
.
Predictions from the Self-Serving Hypothesis
Perceived likelihood measure . According to the SS hypothesis,
individuals are motivated to maximize the Perceived Likelihood of positive
outcomes and minimize the Perceived Likelihood of negative outcomes for
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themselves. There Is no necessary motivation to perceive people as
recipients of deserved outcomes.
events ar e not expected to differ r.T = it)
"
but
b. Positive outcomes s_hould be perceived as morp likelythan negative outcomes (P > N) .
^
There is no motivation postulated to perceive positive or nega-
tive outcomes as being necessarily just or unjust, but only that positive
outcomes are perceived as more likely than negative ones.
c. Therefore, both just-positive and unjust-positive
events should be perceived as more likely than i ust-
negatlve and unjust
-negative events (.IV = ttp ^ t>] ^ tjn)
.
Further, the SS hypothesis assumes the individual is self-servingly
and not other-servlngly motivated with respect to the outcome's Valence;
while no attention is directed towards the outcome's deservingness
.
^' Therefore, the perceived likelihood of just and unjus t
events should not differ across actor and observer
perspectives (JA = JO = UA = UO)
.
but
®* The perceived likelihood of positive and negative outcomes
across perspectives should have the following order; (1)
actor-positive; (2) observer-positive; (3) observer-
negative; and (4) actor-negative (PA > PO > NO > NA)
.
Finally, the deservingness of outcomes are not assumed to have
any effect upon their perceived likelihoods. Rather, only the outcome's
Valence and to whom it happens is assumed to have an effect upon the
Perceived Likelihood measures.
f
•
Therefore, the perceived likelihood of situations should
have the following order: (1) just and unjust actor-
positive; (2) just and unjust observer-positive; (3) just
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and unjust observer-negative; and (4) lust ^nA unjust
.
actor-negative (JPA = UPA > JPQ = UPO > JNO = UNO > JNA =
Locus of causality measure
. According to the SS hypothesis, it
is self-serving for actors to see themselves as responsible for their
positive outcomes; outcomes should be perceived as more likely to recur
if oneself is seen as responsible for their cause. It is not self-
serving, however, to perceive oneself as responsible for negative out-
comes. In the case of observers, it is self-serving to perceive others'
positive outcomes as environmentally caused and not limited to the actions
and/or characteristics of that person being observed. In contrast, it
would be self-serving to see others as responsible for their negative
outcomes.
Therefore
,
personal attributions should be made when
actors receive positive outcomes and observers v iew
others receive negative outcomes. In contrasF, environ-
mental attributions should occur when actors receive
negative and observers view positive outcomes
.
Predictions from the Hedonistic Justice Hypothesis
Perceived likelihood measures
. The HJ hypothesis assumes that
people are motivated to perceive outcomes as deserved rather than
undeserved.
a* Therefore, just events, overall, should be perceived
as more likely than unjust events (J > U)
.
This hypothesis furthar assumes that people are motivated toward
maximizing the Perceived Likelihood of positive outcomes and minimizing
the Perceived Likelihood of negative outcomes.
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ice
ence
^^^^^^^^^^-^^-^^^^JiSZ^^ > N).
Although people are assumed to be motivated to perceive just
over injustice and positive outcomes over negative outcomes, the Val
of an outcome is more important than its deservingness.
^*
^^^^^^^^^^^-^^^^^ILS2Il^±d^^ a^d Valence
have the followjjig_order2_ CO^^^^^^i^IUi^T^TcI)
uiyust-positiveM3)_Just^^
negative (JP > UP > Jn > UN) . " -*
Further, the deservingness of outcomes are more important with
respect to oneself than with respect to others.
^' Therefore, when considering tjWustness of events andthe Perspective
_otLXhoLse,eve^^ their perc"Iivedlikelihood should haye_the_foU^2j^^_o^^
actor; (2) just-observer: (3) uniust-ohs7;^;;Z7r^T77r)
unjust-actor (JA > JO > UO > UA) . ~
Similarly, the Valence of outcomes are more important for oneself
than for others.
®- Therefore, when cons ide.ring__ the Valence of oufroT.P.
yho receives those outcome s together, their perceivPd~~likelihood should have the following order: (1) positive-
actor; (2) positive-observer: npaative-obse'rver : ^nd
(4) negat ive-actor (PA > PO > NO > NA) .
~
Finally, the HJ hypothesis assumes that under specific circum-
stances people are motivated to perceive undeserved outcomes as more
likely than deserved ones. Briefly, actors should not be motivated to
perceive themselves as deserving negative outcomes. This suggests that
actors should perceive unjust-negative outcomes as more likely than
just-negative ones. Observers
, on the other hand, should be motivated
to perceive others' positive outcomes as a result of environmental factors.
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This way the observers themselves are also possible recipients of those
desirable outcomes. Thus, observers should perceive unjust-positive
outcomes as more likely than just-positive ones.
f. I^gr^ e considerijig_jj^justn^ Valence, and Per-
haye_theXonowin^^^
.
u
.
n
.i ust-posi.tive_ac^tor^^
l^Lju£t^2ositi^^^
iM.unju^t:^ti^ u-^z^^^^^T^;
Locus of causality measure. The HJ hypothesis, for the most
part, makes the same assumptions as the SS hypothesis with respect to
attributing causality. Although the motive to maximize desirable and
minimize undesirable outcomes is the primary motive, there are also con-
siderations of the deservingness of those outcomes.
Therefore, strong per sonal attributions should be made
when the outcomes are positive for actors and negative"
for observers. In contrast, moderate environmentaT
at tributions (due to a counter-acting motive to per-
ceive deservingness) should hP made when the ourrnmTs
are negat ive for actors and positive for observers
.
A summary of all the predictions from the three hypotheses are
in Appendix I.
The Relation Between the Perceived Likelihood
and Locus of Causality Measures
The Perceived Likelihood measure indicates the extent to which
people perceive that inputs and outcomes are appropriately (or inappro-
priately) aligned. In much of the literature reviewed the assignment of
responsibility to the person for his outcome has been assumed to be the
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process by which the perceived alignment was formed. However, people
can be perceived as getting what they deserve, not because of a causal
link between inputs and outcomes, but because the environment in some
way "provides" the alignment.
Nevertheless, the present writer believes that assigning
responsibility is the modal method for aligning inputs and outcomes as
had been assumed in the literature previously reviewed. The Locus of
Causality measure provides the opportunity to test this assumption.
It is predicted that Peop le who perceive the wnrlH ashighly ^ust willJ>ejnor^JJJcel>^_^^ personiTl^less likely to make environmental) a t tTib^Igig^T;;^
causality than people who perceive thr^orld as lessjust. — ~
39
CHAPTER V
METHOD
Questionnaires were constructed Iron which the predictions of
the
.„st world, self-serving, and Hedonistic Justice hypotheses could
be tested. One set of lte»s In the cuestlonnalre was designed to rep-
resent different sorts of events which systematically varied the Just-
ness and valence of these events, along with the respondent's Perspec-
tive. The respondents' ratings on the perceive occurrence or likelihood
of these various events were obtained. A second set of Items In the
questionnaire measured the tendences of respondents to attribute
causality for the recipients' outcomes to either the environment or
directly to the person. The pattern of results obtained from both of
these measures provides evidence as to which of the above hypotheses Is
most tenable. The last section of the questionnaire contained items
that obtained a rough indication of the respondent's socio-economic
Status.
Respondents
Two samples were used in the study. One sample consisted of
eighty college students. The other sample consisted of 80 members of
a disadvantaged minority group.
Privileged sample
.
The "privileged" respondents were students
from Amherst and Smith colleges. Eighty respondents were used from
ex-
pon-
psychology Classes at the two schools. The participants received
peridental credits for completing the questionnaires. Forty res
dents were randomly administered the Actor version and forty the
Observer version of the questionnaire. Of the 27 male respondents in
the privileged sample, 13 received the Actor and 14 the Observer ver-
sions. Of the 53 females in this sample. 27 completed the Actor ver-
sion of the questionnaire and 26 the Observer version. The average age
for males and females were 19.93 and 20.09 years respectively.
Underprivileged sample. The underprivileged respondents were
Puerto Ricans living in New England. None of these respondents had a
college education. Eighty respondents were recruited through various
agencies in Connecticut and Massachusetts which were involved in aiding
members of the Spanish-speaking community. The participants were paid
two dollars after completing the questionnaire. Forty respondents were
randomly administered the Actor version and forty the Observer version
of the questionnaire. Of the 54 males in this sample, 26 responded to
the Actor version and 28 to the Observer versions. Of the 26 females,
14 received the Actor and 12 the Observer versions. The average age
for underprivileged males was 20.35 years and for females 20.14 years.
Experimental Designs
Perceived likelihood measures. A three-between and two-within
subjects mixed design was used to assess the respondents' reports of
how likely various kinds of events were perceived to occur. The
between-subject variables were the Sample from which the respondent was
drawn (privilged vs. underprivileged), the respondent's Perspective
(actor vs. observer), and Sex („ale vs. female). The wlehxn-sub^ ect
variables were the Justness Qust vs. unjust) and Valence (positive vs.
negative) of the event's outcome.
Locus of Ca„saliry m^.^um-. A four-between and one-wlthln
subjects mixed design was employed in the examination of the respon-
dents' attributions of causality. The between-subject variables were
the respondefs Rank (high vs. low) on a Perceived Justice Score, the
Sample (privileged vs. underprivileged) from which he/she was drawn,
their Perspective (actor vs. observer) and Sex (male vs. female). The
withln-subject variable was the Valence (positive vs. negative) of the
event's outcome.
Construction of Items and Questionnaires
Each respondent was given a thirty-six item questionnaire.
TVelve of the items were constructed to measure the perceived likelihood
that various kinds of events were perceived to occur. A second set of
twelve items measured where respondents tended to locate causality.
Lastly, twelve items requested information about the respondent's back-
ground.
Perceived Likelihood items. These items measure the likelihood
that respondents perceive inputs and outcomes to be aligned or not
aligned. They are aligned when both the imputs and outcomes are posi-
tive or both are negative. They are not aligned when one is positive
and the other is negative. Thus, items representing just events have
the inputs and outcomes aligned. Items representing unjust events do
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do not have the Inputs and outcomes aligned.
in order to account for the possibility that the perceived like-
lihood of any given event may be unique to the theme (e.g., favorahlllty
Of evaluations, grades In school, etc.) of that event, each Item theme
was systematically varied In Its Justness. Valence, and Perspective.
Thus, for each of the 12 Item themes there were eight variations: (1,
Actor Just-Positlve; (2) Actor Just-Negative; (3) Actor Unjust-Positive;
(4) Actor Unjust-Negative; (5) Observer Just-Posltlve; (6) Observer Just-
Negative; (7) Observer Unjust-Posltlve; and (8) Observer Unjust-Negative.
Taken together. 12 Item themes
. 2 levels of Justness x 2 levels of
valance x 2 Perspectives results In 96 total Items. See Appendices IIA
and riB for the English and Spanish versions of these items respectively.
Each lte«, was rated on a six-interval scale. These intervals
were labeled: Extremely True. Generally True, Somewhat True, Somewhat
untrue. Generally Unture. and Extremely Untrue. Ratings going from Ex-
tremely True through Extremely Untrue on these items represented de-
creases in the Perceive Likelihood of that event occurring.
Locus of Causality items
. The same twelve item themes used In
the Perceived Likelihood Items were employed with the Locus of Causality
items. The Valence and Perspective of each item Theme were systemati-
cally varied. There were. then, four variations for each Theme: (1)
Actor-Posltlve; (2) Actor-Negative; (3) Observer-Positive; and (4) Obser-
ver-Negative. Taken together 12 item Themes x 2 Valence levels x 2 Per-
spectives results in a total of 48 Locus of Causality items. See
Appendix IIIA and IIIB for the English and Spanish versions of the Items
respectivly.
On each Iten, „c alternative choices vera provided, one alterna-
tive attributes causality of the Item's outcome to the person, and the
other alternative attributes causality to environmental factors, l^e
more often respondents chose personal causes over environmental causes,
the greater their tendency to perceive people as personally responsible
for their outcomes.
questionnaire obtained rough estimates of the respondent's socio-
economic status. "Actual" and "Perceived" (i.e.. compared to the "aver-
age" person) estimates of their parent's income and educational levels,
as veil as their own educational levels, were requested. Also obtained
were the respondents' age, sex. and self-ratings of "perceived oppor-
tunities." These items are shown in Appendices IVA and IVB.
Construction of questionnaires
. There were four Forms of ques-
tionnaires. Each Form was constructed by randomly assigning without
replacement the item Themes to the various types of events. For the
perceived Likelihood items. Appendix V demonstrates the characteristic
of each form: (A) Actor and Observer questionnaires had the same
themes assigned to the same type of events within each form; (b) no one
Theme was repeated within each Form; (c) each Form had three Themes
within each type of event; and (d) no Theme was represented more than
once in the same type of event between Forms.
On the Locus of Causality items the following characteristic of
each Form can be noted: (a) Actor and Observer questionnaires had the
ss.. The.es assigned to the sa.e type of events^ each Po™; (h) „o
one ^e.e was repeated™ each For.; (c) each For. had six The.es
iithin each type of event; and (d) no one The.e was represented in the
same type of event between Fonns.
For the Background Characteristic lte.s the four questionnaire
Forms had the sa.e twelve ite.s. Thus, there were no differences be-
tween Forms on these items.
Lastly, in each Form, the Perceived Likelihood and Locus of
Causality items were randomly ordered within their respective parts of
the questionnaire.
Independent Manipulation of Types of Events
iyitnes^^f_e2^er^ Items were manipulated to represent "just"
and
-unjust- events. Just items describe situations where an individual
gets what he deserves, while unjust items are represented by situations
where the individual does not get what he deserves. I^e item's Justice
(or injustice) was established in either one of two ways: (1) having the
item directly state that the individuals "deserve" (or do not deserve")
what happens to them; or (2) by aligning (or not aligning) the favor-
ability of the individuals' inputs (e.g., his personal characteristics
and/or behaviors) with the Valence of their outcomes.
To establish whether the items were perceived as representing
just and unjust situations, judges were asked to rate them on a six-
point just-unjust scale. The means and standard deviations for the 12
items themes across all types of events are shown in Appendix VI. With
the higher scores indicating just ratings, it is clear ^h.^ • •5 , -Lt x C t at just items
were rated as more "iiieif" ^Kor,just than unjust items. Furthermore, as Appendix VI
indicates, this occurred regardless of whether the items' outcomes were
positive or negative, and regardless of whether they referred to one-
self (i.e.. actor's perspective) or to other people (i.e.. observer's
perspective)
.
V^i^Il^e_oLout^ Each event described in the items had
either a positive or a negative outcome. Positive outcomes were repre-
sented by Pleasant or desirable circumstances, such as receiving "good
grades," "favorable evaluations," or "receiving love." m contrast,
negative outcomes were represented by undesirable circumstances such
as receiving "bad grades," "unfavorable evaluations," or "not receiving
love." Generally, if given the choice between positive and negative
outcomes, the individual would prefer the former and avoid the latter.
No independent ratings of the items' Valences were obtained, in that
that outcomes of the items appear clearly desirable or undesirable.
Perspective of respondents
. The respondents were instructed to
refer to the items with respect to themselves (Actors) or to other people
in general (Observers). Tl,us, the Actor's perspective was established
by instructing the respondents to react to the items with respect to
themselves. Further, the items in the Actor version were worded in the
first person singular "I." m the Observer's version, the respondent was
Instructed to refer to the items with respect to other people in general.
Items in this perspective were reworded by replacing the first person
singular pronoun "I" with a third person plural noun (e.g., "people,"
"students," "childrpn"^ aC dren). See Appendices VIIA and VIIB for the English
instructions and Vine and VIIid for tho tvii u t e Spanish instructions used to
establish the Perspectives.
English and Spanish Questionnaire Versions
The questionnaires had two translations: English and Spanish.
The purpose of the Spanish version was to accomodate those respondents
of the Underprivileged Sample (I.e.. the Hispanic people) who were not
fluent in English.
The questionnaire was first written in English and then trans-
lated into Spanish. Three research assistants worked together on the
translation: one of the assistant's native language was Spanish, and
another had studied In Spain for a year. All three were fluent in
Spanish. The translations of the Instructions and lten,s were done more
according to their "spirit" and "meaning" than direct, literal Interpre-
tations. Several drafts of the translations were made. After each
draft they were given to native (mostly staff members of the agencies
where respondents were eventually recruited) Spanish people to be re-
translated into English and/or revisions made of problem areas, as seen
by these people. The third revision was used as the form administered
to the respondents.
Tests were made of the comparability of the two translations.
Perceived Justice (PJ) Scores (see p. 69 of the "Results" section for
an explanation of this score) of underprivileged respondents that took
the English translations were compared with those who took the Spanish
translations. The analysis. Including both actor and observer question-
naires, showed no difference in the PJ Scores between those who took the
English and Spanish translations (t..81, df=78; two tailed test). With
actor and observer questionnaires analyzed separately there was again no
significant difference between the English and Spanish translations
(t=1.99 and t=.39, df=38; two tailed tests, p >
.05).
These tests indicated the underprivileged respondents taking the
English version did not differ from those taking the Spanish transla-
tion. These results further suggest there is little or no effect due
to the language of the questionnaire taken by the respondents.
General Procedure
Privileged sample
. Participants in this sample were members of
psychology classes at Smith and Amherst Colleges. The questionnaires
were administered during the scheduled class hour. After the question-
naires were distributed, the respondents were asked to read the introduc-
tory page and then continue through the questionnaire until they had
completed it. Any questions concerning the instructions were dealt with
on an individual basis between the respondent and the person administer-
ing the questions. If any questions about the items were asked, the
respondent was encouraged to mark the answer he/she thought was best.
Respondents were also requested to check each page to be certain they
had responded to all the items. Finally, as each questionnaire was re-
turned to the administer, each page was quickly checked for any omissions.
Two week after all the data were collected, two of the three
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Classes
.Ha. too.
.He
.ues..o„n...e
„e.e a „u.e„
.e..ien„, as
to the purpose of the questionnaire.
IInderErlvUe£ed.sa^ Participates In this sample were re-
cruited through various agencies m the Spanish-spea.lng co^unlty which
were designed to assist Hispanic people. Tne questionnaires were admin-
istered in groups ranging in number fro. five to about fifteen. The
author and one of the three bilingual research assistants was present
during the administrations of the questionnaires.
Participants were given the choice of responding to either the
English or Spanish translations of the questionnaire. They were encour-
aged to take the translation with which they would feel most comfortable.
As with the privileged sample, the respondents were asked to read the
Introductory page, the Instructions, and to continue through the ques-
tionnaire until it was completed. Questions concerning the Instructions
and items were taken by the bilingual research assistant. The assistants
were instructed to respond to these questions in the same manner de-
scribed for the privileged respondents. Again, as each questionnaire
was returned the pages were checked for omissions. Finally, questions
were answered and the respondents were paid two dollars.
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CHAPTER VI
RESULTS
The results of this study are reported t„ three sections. First,
we examine the respondents' ratings of their "actual" and "perceived"
background characteristics. Second. „e consider the respondents'
tendencies to perceive people as getting what they deserve (justice) or
not getting what they deserve Cinjustice), along with their perceptions
that people receive desirable (positive) or undesirable (negative) out-
comes. In this section the effects of the respondents' Perspective,
Sex, and Privllegedness are examined. Third, „e review data on attrib-
utions of causality to personal vs. situational sources. This data Is
also examined with respect to the respondents' Perspective, Sex, and
Privllegedness
.
Background Characteristics
What were the backgrounds of the respondents? Part C of the
questionnaire obtained ratings on background characteristics. These
ratings were intended to provide rough indications of the respondents'
socio-economic conditions. The privileged and underprivileged samples
are compared in Table 1.
revalues showed that the two samples differed significantly
(p < .001) on all the characteristics except Age. These results in-
dicate that members of the privileged sample reported higher family
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incomes, and higher education levels both for themselves and their
parents, than did members of the underprivileged sample. Further, the
privileged respondents perceived their family's incomes, education
levels, and opportunities as significantly higher than those perceived
by the underprivileged respondents (all revalues had p < .001). It
should be noted, however, the background characteristics between the
two samples tended to have smaller "perceived" differences than "actual"
differences
.
Background characteristics were also examined with respect to
the sex and perspectives of the respondents. Females rated higher than
mles their mother's educational level (F
^^^^^
= 9.59; p < .002). and
also perceived themselves as having more opportunity to live a satis-
fying life than did males (F
^^^3^
= 5.62; p < ,032). Males and
females did not differ on any of the other background characteristics.
Finally, respondents who completed the "actor" version of the question-
naire did not differ on any of the characteristics from those who
completed the "observer" version.
To summarize, both samples reported "actual" and "perceived"
backgrounds which were quite different, although the differences of
their "perceived" backgrounds tended to be smaller than the actual
differences. Both samples were comparable in their ages. Lastly, the
background characteristics of males, females, actors, and observers
for the most part did not differ significantly.
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Perceived Likelihood of Outcomes
It was noted earlier that outcomes of events can vary both in
Justness (from just to unjust) and in Valence (from positive to nega-
tive). n,is section examines whether just outcomes are perceived as
more likely that unjust outcomes, and if positive outcomes are per-
ceived to occur more frequently than negative ones. We will also see
If the Justness (i.e., deservingness) of an outcome is more important
to the individual than its Valence (i.e., desirability). It is also
important to examine the recipients of these outcomes. Thus, the
respondent's Perspective, Sex, and Privilegedness will be examined.
The results in this section are based upon a three-between and
two-within analysis of variance (see Table 2). The between subjects
variables are the Perspective (actor vs. observer) and Sex (male vs.
female) of the respondents, and the Sample (privileged vs. under-
privileged) from which the respondent is drawn. The within subject
variables are the Justness (just vs. unjust) and Valence (positive vs.
negative) of the recipients* outcomes.
Justness and valence of outcomes
. Which of the three hypotheses,
the Hedonistic Justness (HJ)
, Just World (JW) , or Self-S^rving (SS),
Is best able to predict the results? According to the HJ hypothesis,
the outcome's Justness and Valence are both important. Briefly, this
hypothesis predicts just outcomes should be perceived as more likely
than unjust ones, and positive outcomes as more likely than negative
ones. In addition, since the Valence of outcomes are assumed to be of
more importance than their Justness, both just- and unjust-positive
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TABLE 2
PERSPECTIVE, SEX, AND PRIVILEGEDNESS
Source of Variance
Between Variables
Sample (A)
Perspective (B)
Sex (C)
AB
AC
BC
ABC
Error
Within Variables
Justness (D)
AD
BD
CD
ABD
ACD
BCD
ABCD
Error
Valence (E)
AE
BE
CE
ABE
ACE
BCE
ABCE
Error
DE
ADE
BDE
CDE
ABDE
ACDE
BCDE
ABCDE
Error
DF
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
152
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
152
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
152
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
152
MS
285.72
7.30
18.90
1.68
.77
A. 84
1.19
6.49
1365.41
166.76
20.36
1.21
9.95
3.59
48.74
.02
7.30
104.34
8.97
1.76
11.29
20.61
.45
15.54
.05
4.99
166.67
-1.41
3.24
19.12
13.62
11.54
15.95
7.29
5.10
44.02 D<.00]
1.13
'
2.91
187.14 p<.001
22.86 p<.001
2.79 p<.097
1.36
6.68 p<.011
20.88 p<.001
1.80
2.26
4.13 p<.044
3.11
32.69 p<.001
3.75 p<.055
2.67
2.26
3.13
1.43
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outco.es Should be pe.oeived
..s .ore U.el, than Just.
.„d u„,„3t-
negatlve outco.es. The « ,,pothesis predicts onl, that Just outco.es
WUI be perceived as .ore fre,uent than unjust ones regardless of their
Valence. Finally, the SS hypothesis focuses on the Valence of the out-
co.es and not their Justness. According to this hypothesis, positive
outco.es Should be perceived as .ore likely than negative ones.
To test these predictions, separate scores were co.puted for
the Perceived Likelihood of Just. ^Just, positive, and negative out-
co.es. These scores were computed by adding the Individual's six Ite.
scores for each of these four types of outco.es. Each score had a
possible range of 6 to 36; the higher the score, the higher the Perceived
Likelihood of that type of outcome.
Table 3 indicates that Just outcomes were perceived as .ore
likely than unjust outcomes (J > u). and positive outcomes as more
likely than negative ones (P > N). The analysis of variance in Table 2
shows these differences to be highly significant for both Justness
1.152 - P < -001) and the Valence (F
^^^^^
= 20.89; p < .001)
of the outcomes. Thus, people were reported as .ore likely to be
recipients of deserved than undeserved, and desirable thar. undesirable
outcomes.
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TABLE 3
MEAN PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD OF THE
JUSTNESS AND VALENCE OF OUTCOMES
Type of Oi.itcome
Mean
Justness
Just
Unjust
25.62
19.64
Valence
.
—
Positive
Negative
23.51
21.77
To this point we have examined the Justness and Valence of out-
comes separately. The items in the questionnaire, however, described
events in which the Justness and Valence of the outcomes occurred
together; this provides the opportunity to examine whether the Valence
of the outcome (i.e., its desirability) is more important than its
Justness (i.e., deservingness)
. To do this, scores were computed by
adding the respondents' three item scores for each of the just-positive,
just-negative, unjust-positive, and unjust-negative outcomes. The
scores for each of these types of outcomes had a possible range of 3 to
18; the higher scores indicating a higher Perceived Likelihood of that
type of outcome.
The results show that the outcome's Justness was more important
than its Valence; both just-positive and just-negative outcomes were
perceived as more likely than unjust outcomes of either valence (see
Table 4). However, Table 4 also shows that just^positive outcomes were
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perceived a. ^r. likel,
.han Jus.-negative ones, but that ur,Just out-
comes o, either valence were perceived as equally likel, (JP > j« . up .
UN). Generally, these results Indicate that people are typically per-
ceived as getting what they deserve, especially when they deserve
desirable outco„.s (F
^^^3^ = 32.69; p < .001). For example, a person's
good deeds (.isdeeds) are „ore often noticed and rewarded (punished) than
not, and good deeds are more often rewarded than misdeeds are punished.
TABLE 4
MEAN PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD OF JUST AND UNJUST
EVENTS WITH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE OUTCOMES
Justness of
Outcomes
Valence of Outcomes
Positive Negative
Just 13.88^ 11.83*'
Unjust 9.62^ 9.64^
""""
--.-i-^t^LeuL xeccers are significantly
different (p < .01 by Neuman-Keuls test).
Which of the three hypotheses fares the best? No one of them
was able to predict all the results obtained. The HJ hypothesis was
supported by the fact that both the Justness and Valence of the out-
comes had significant effects. However, its assumption that the out-
come's desirability (i.e., Valence) is more important than its deserving-
ness (i.e.. Justness) was not confirmed. Instead, the deservingness of
the outcome was more important than its desirability (JP and JN > UP and
UN). Nevertheless, desirable outcomes were more important than un-
desirable ones when they were deserved (JP > JN > UP = UN) , The JW and
SS hypotheses fared less well; neither predicted that both the deservlng-
ness and desirability of the outcomes would have an Influence on the
Perceived Likelihood measures,
Reci^t^^f^u^eo^ Do people in different positions and
roles perceive their outco.es similarly or differently? This section
will focus on three general questions: (1) are outcomes perceived
differently if oneself is the recipient (actor's perspective) than if
someone else is the recipient (observer's perspective); (2) do males
and females perceive outcomes differently; and (3) does one's degree
of privilegedness affect the perceptions of outcomes?
Actors vs. observers
: The HJ, JT^, and SS hypotheses make pre^
dictions with respect to only the first of the above three questions.
According to the HJ hypothesis, just outcomes should be perceived as
more likely for oneself than for others and unjust outcomes as less
likely for oneself than for others. Similarly, positive outcomes
should be reported as more likely for oneself than for others and
negative outcomes as less likely for oneself than for others. The
predictions of the SS hypothesis focus only on the outcome's Valence;
positive outcomes should be perceived as more likely and negative out-
comes less likely for oneself than for others. Finally, the M hypo-
thesis predicts no differences between actor and observer perspectives.
Figure 3 indicates there was only a trend to perceive just out-
comes as more likely and unjust outcomes as less likely for oneself than
for others (F^^^^^ = 2.79; p < .097). Furthermore, the direction of
this trend was entirely due to the perceptions of female respondents as
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indicated by tV-- Ppr'-r.^^f---,y h. Perspective x Se:: x Justness interaction (F
48.74; p < nn TT- / 1,152P -oil.. Fxaure 4 shows onl, ,.^Us
.epor.ed Just outcomes
as
..or. likely themselves than for others andn , unjust outcomes as
less Ukel, for
..^selves than for others (, < .oi h. «euman-Keuls
test). Males r.,orted no differences between themselves and others-
although there
....s to he a nonsignificant trend for males to per-
ceive fewer jus. .nd more unjust outcomes for themselves than for others.
Do actors and observers differ >-a tt with respect to the Valence of
outcomes. Our results Indicate that positive outcomes were perceived a
.ore llKel. to c.ur than negative outcomes (K
^
.
,0.33, , . .OOi,
regardless of wUther oneself or some other persl was the recipient
(F
< 1). Furthermore, this was true for both males and females
1,152 ' 3.11; p < .08).
The HJ hvpothesls made one other prediction concerning the
actor and observer perspectives. Rather than detailing this complex
prediction here (.ee Appendix I for the specific prediction), let It he
sufficient to sa, that the respondents' perspective had no significant
effect upon the J.int operation of the outcome's Justness and Valence
(P
< 1). Respondents perceived both themselves and others as typically
receiving Just ou:comes. especially when those Just outcomes were
positive.
«ales_vs^jemales: It has already been noted that females
perceive Justice a. more likely for themselves than for others, while
»ales perceived nc differences between themselves and others. There
was a trend toward one other sex difference; females tended to perceive
61
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Just-nega.lve outcomes as less Hka,
.han did „ies. and „ales tended
to perceive both unjust-posltlve and unjust
-negative outco.es are
.ore
lively than did females (see Figure 5). The analysis of variance In
Table 2 shows this Sex x Justness x Valence Interaction to approach
statistical significance (F
^
.^^^
. 3.75; p < .055).
In spite of the above differences,
.e.bers of both sexes were
actually quite comparable. Both
.ales and females perceived Just out-
comes as .ore likely than unjust outco.es, and positive outcomes as
n.ore llRely than negative ones. Also, both sexes perceived no differ-
ences between themselves and others with respect to the Valence of
outcomes.
^^iXileS£d^-_^^ Does one's degree of privileged-
ness affect the Perceived Likelihood of certain types of outcomes? For
the most part, the privileged and underprivileged samples had quite
comparable results. Both samples perceived Just outcomes as more likely
than unjust outcomes, and positive outcomes as more likely than negative
ones. Females from both samples reported just outcomes as more likely
and unjust outcomes as less likely for themselves than for others.
There were, however, some differences between the two samples.
As Table 5 shows, the two samples did not differ on the perceived
occurrence of just outcomes, but they did differ on the perceived
occurrence of unjust outcomes. More specifically, the underprivileged
sample reported a greater likelihood of unjust outcomes than did the
privileged sample. The analysis of variance in Table 2 shows this
Sample x Justness interaction to be highly significant (F = 22.86;
P < .001).
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TABLE 5
MEAN PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD OF JUST AND UNJUST OUTCOMF.FOR PRIVILEGED AND UNDERPRIVILEGED
^^ONDEN^S
Respondent 's
Sample
Privileged
Underprivileged
Justness of Outcomes
Note: Cell means with different letters
different (p < .01 by l,eu:^7-i:'nLVasl)^'''"'''''^'
The sample from which the respondent came had one other signifi-
cant effect (see Table 6). It „as found that privileged respondents
perceived a greater occurrence of positive than negative outcomes both
for themselves and for others. In contrast, underprivileged respondents
perceived that only positive outcomes for themselves were more likely
than negative outcomes for others. It is also interesting to note the
underprivileged sample reported a greater likelihood of both positive
and negative outcomes than did the privileged sample.
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TABLE 6
"^^
^Zlurf OF °l'TCOI«S ACROSSVALENCE, SAMPLE, AND PERSPECTIVE
Respondents
'
-
—
Valence of Outcomes
Sample Perspective Positive Negative
Privileged Actor 22.88^ 19.83^
Observer 21.78^ 20.10^
Under-
privileged
Actor 24. 88^^ 23.85'^'^
Observer 24.63^'^ 23. 30^^
...
^-.u„u.. icuLMs are significantlydifferent (p < .01 by Neuman-Keuls Test)!
To summarize, the Perceived Likelihood measure yielded the
following interesting results: (1) Just outcomes were perceived as .ore
likely than unjust outcomes (J > u); (2) positive outcomes were reported
as more likely than negative ones (P > N) ; (3) just outcomes of either
valence were perceived as more likely than unjust outcomes of either
valence (JP and JN > UP and UN); (4) Just-positive outcomes were per-
ceived as more likely than Just-negative ones while there were no dif-
ferences between unjust-positive and unjust-negative outcomes (JP > jN >
UP = UN); (5) this was true for both perspectives (JPA = JPO > JNA = JNO >
UPA = UPO - UNA = UNO); (6) females perceived just outcomes as more
likely for themselves than for others and mijust outcomes as less likely
for themselves than for others CJAF > JOF > UOF > UAF)
, while males
reported their own and other's outcomes similarly CJAM = JOM > UAM = UOM)
;
and (7) both samples reported more Just than unjust outcomes, but under-
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TABLE 7
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR
ATTRIBUTION OF CAUSALITY
Source of Variance
Between Variables
PJ-Rank (A)
Sample (B)
Perspective (C)
Sex (D)
AB
AC
AD
BC
CD
ABC
ABD
ACD
BCD
ABCD
Error
Within Variables
Valence (E)
AE
BE
CE
DE
ABE
ACE
ADE
BCE
BDE
CDE
ABCE
ABDE
ACDE
BCDE
ABCDE
Error
DF
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
120
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
120
MS
20.31
5.17
.17
.01
1.12
2.06
1.35
.01
5.19
2.07
.06
.07
.79
.07
1.55
40.89
1.28
2.30
1.23
7.23
2.85
.14
1.47
.55
.72
1.49
.99
3.47
.27
2.28
8.18
1.22
13.14 p<.00l
3.35 p<.070
1.33
3.36 p<.069
1.34
33.43 p<.001
1.05
1.88
1.01
5.92 p<.017
2.33
1.20
1.22
2.84
1.86
6.69 p<.011
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privileged respondents perceived more unjust outcomes than the
privileged respondents.
Locus of Causality
What "reasons" do people give for the outcomes they receive?
Are people attributed with personal responsibility for their outcomes,
or are situational factors perceived as the cause? Are there differences
when the outcomes are positive rather than negative? Do people perceive
their ovm outcomes as occurring for different reasons than the outcomes
of others? These are some of the questions „e will focus on in the
present section.
The results from this section are based upon a four-betveen and
one-within analysis of variance (see Table 7). The between subjects
variables are the respondents' PJ Ranks (high vs. low), Perspectives
(actor vs. observer). Sex (male vs. female), and the Sample from which
he/she was drawn (privileged vs. underprivileged). The within subject
variable was the Valence (positive vs. negative) of the recipient's
outcomes.
Predicted vs. obtained results
. According to the HJ hypothesis
people will make stron^_^ersonal attributions of responsibility if an
outcome is positive for themselves (actor's perspective) and negative
for others (observer's perspective), and weak situational attributions
if the outcomes are negative for themselves and positive for others. The
SS hypothesis makes parallel predictions to those of the HJ hypothesis,
but that both the personal and the situational attributions are predicted
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to be strong. The OV, hypothesis predicts that both actors and observers
will ^ke strong personal attributions regardless of the outcome's
valence.
To test these predictions Locus of Causality (LOC) scores were
developed for each respondent. These scores were computed by adding the
number of tl„es the respondent chose a personal cause (scored as "l"),
rather than a situational cause (scored as "O")
. for a given outcome's
occurrence, since there were twelve Items for each respondent, the LOC
score had a possible range of 0 to 12, with scores below six indicating
the tendency to make situational attributions and scores above six
indicating more personal attributions. Since half of the twelve items
had positive outcomes and the other half negative outcomes, the scores
ranged from 0 to 6 when the valence of the outcomes was a variable
Included in the analysis.
The results in Table 8 show that actors and observers did not
differ. That is, people reported themselves and others as equally
responsible for the outcomes they received. Although people were
generally perceived as personally responsible for both their positive
and negative outcomes (i.e., all cell means were above "S")
,
they were
perceived as more responsible for their positive than their negative
outcomes.
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TABLE 8
MEAN LOCUS OF CAUSALITY SCORES FOR ACTORS ANnOBSERVERS FOR POSITIVE AND NEGAnVE oScOmS'
Valence of
Outcomes
Positive
Negative
Respondent's Perspective
Actor
4.82^
4.01^
Observer
4,86^
3.99^
*Means are based on 0 to 6 scale.
Note: Cell means with different letters are significantlvdifferent (p < .Qi by Neuman-Keuls Test)
^
Clearly, the absence of an interaction between the respondent's
perspective and the outcome's valence (F
^^^^^
= i.oi; p < .317) .as
inconsistent with both the HJ and SS hypotheses. On the other hand, the
absence of this interaction (i.e., the consistent attributions to per-
sonal rather than situational sources) see.s to support the JW hypothesis;
however, the obtained differences between positive and negative outcomes
tends to argue against it. Since no firm conclusions can now be made,
let us turn to some additional analyses.
Causal attributions by hi.h and In., p t o do people who report
that justice is highly likely to occur differ in their causal attrib-
utions from people who report justice as less likely to occur? We will
now examine whether respondents who score high with respect to perceiving
justice differ in their attributions of responsibility from those who
score lower.
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Respondents we.e categorUed as either '-High" or .^0^. on the
basis of a Perceived Justice (pj) Scorp v uLi-J; e. Each respondent's PJ Score was
computed by adding justUem scores Ci e ^h p^- -£££ (I. ., t e Perceived Likelihood ofjust outcomes) with the inverse of th.
higher the reported HlfpHh^r,^ ^IxkeUhood ot Just outcomes and lower the likelihood
of unjust outcomes, the higher the PJ qrn-r. c-S Score. Since each respondent rated
twelve items on 1 to 6 interval scales rh.dj. , t e possible range of the PJ
Sco.es U .o 72. The si«ee„
.espon.ents „UH t^e
..,Hes. P. Sco.es
in each g.„.p c.e.. prlvUegea-acor
. privUe.ed-o.se.ve..
„„ae.p.,v,-
leged-actor. and underprivileged-observer groups) were classified as
were eliminated, there werp 19«e 128 (as opposed to all 160) respondents
represented in the analysis.
Table 9 shows that respondents who had high PJ Scores were ™ore
likely to perceive people as personally responsible for their outcomes
received (I.e., had higher LOC scores, than respondents who had low PJ
Scores (F
^^^^o
= ".M; p < .001).
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TABLE 9-
MEAN LOCUS OF CAUSALITY SCORFq fhp t, t n
,
OUTCOMES. AND SsPONn™Jc\r^.^^!' .^^ENCE OF
Variable
Level Mean
PJ
Kank High
Low 8.19
Valence of Outcomes Positive
Negative 4.0Q
Respondent's
Privilegedness Privileged
Underprivileged
9.14
^
8.55
**P < .001
rke above results Indicate a relationship exists between per-
ceiving people as getting „bat the. deserve and perceiving the. as
personally responsible for their outco.es. „o„ strong was this rela-
tionship, TO assess this, correlations were computed between the Pd
and LOC scores across a variety of categories (see Table 10)
.
Clearly, there was a significant positive relationship between
the Pd and LOC Scores, such that Increasing perceptions of Justice by
respondents was associated with increasing attributions of personal
(rather than situational) responsibility to the recipients of outcomes.
Although this association was true for all categories of respondents. It
was significantly stronger for males than for females (Z = 2.05; p < . 02
and tended to be stronger for the privileged than the underprivileged
respondents (Z = 1.71; p < .055).
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TABLE IQ
CORRELATIONS BEWEEN PERCEIVED JUSTICE (PJ)LOCUS OF CAUSALITY (LOC) SCORES
Variable Level
r Value
PJ
Rank
High
Low
.25
,36
*-*-^*3p*JiiUfc!ri L S
Privilegedness
Privileged
Underpr ivileged
•58^
.34'"
Perspective Actor
v^Dserver
.39
.53
Sex Male
Female
.39
All Respondents
.45
Note: All correlations
.05 level.
were significant at least at the
*P < .055
**P < .023
Males vs. femal.s
. Previously „e noted that males and females
differed on the Perceived Likelihood of just and unjust outcomes when
the respondent's perspectives were considered. Are there sax differences
on the LOC measure? As Figure 6 suggests, females tended to attribute
more personal responsibility to themselves than to others for outcomes
received. In contrast, males tended to attribute less personal respon-
sibility to themselves and more to others. The analysis of variance in
Table 7 shows this Perspective x Sex Interaction to approach statistical
significance (F
^^^^^
= 3.36; p < .069).
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Males and females differed in r.r."^-i-j. j-crea m one other resDpr^• ,«oipect, males perceived
people as e,.an.
.espons.Me
.... po.U.ve a„a
.He..
„esa.,.e o.-
co.es. „Hne
.eFaxes pe.ee.ve. people as ™.e pe.sonall, responsible
.o.
positive than negative outoo.es (see Table 11). This Valence x Sex
interaction was statistically significant (F = 5 92- o, , ^1,120 ^^'> P = -Oil).
TABLE 11
=^^1" SCORES FOR MALES AND
Valence of
Outcomes
Sex of Respondent
Male Female
Positive 4.59^ 5.09^^
Negative 4.18^ 3.83^
Note: Cell means sharing a common letter are significantlydifferent (p < .Qi by Neuman-Keuls Test) .
^
Z£Mlege<L^ underprivileged. How do privileged and under-
privileged people compare on their tendencies to make personal and
situational causal attributions? The mean LOC scores comparing these
two samples are shown in Table 9. Although these means failed to differ
at an acceptable level of statistical significance, privileged respond-
ents tended to be more likely than
.oderprivileged respondents to per-
ceive people as personally responsible for their outcomes (F
1,120
3.35; p < .070).
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TO .^r,..,
.He LOC data ,,elded
.He following i„.e.esa„,
resux..: (,) peopXe pe.ee.ved Ho.H tHe^selves and o.He.s as „o.e
Often responsible than not resDon<5-ihi . fspons ble for the outcomes they receive;
(.2) males perceived peonle ^n„^nP pi as equally responsible for their positive and
negative outcomes, but females perceived th^n, .em as more responsible for
positive than negative outco.es. (3) respondents „Ho perceived Justice
as hishl. UUel. (Hi,H P.s) „o.e readU. perceived peopie as personaii,
responsible for tHeir outcomes tHan respondents „Ho perceived Justice as
less li.el, (.o« P.s);
,_les tended to perceive themselves as .ore
personal!, responsible for tHeir o™ outco.es than others were for theirs
While .ales had a tendency to assign less responsihilit, to themselves
and .ore to others; (5) privileged respondents tended to perceive people
as personally responsible for their outco.es than did the under-
privileged respondents; and (6) neither the HI, J„. nor SS hypotheses
received unequivocal support.
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CHAPTER VII
DISCUSSION
In this final chapter we will fl^^oT,^ -H i. attend to two general types of
questions. The first set of questions refers to the perceived character
of the outco.es. Are they typically perceived as justified and deserved
or as capricious and arbitrary? Are desirable outcomes perceived as
more likely to occur than undesirable ones? Does it .ake any difference
whether oneself or someone else is the recipient of the outcomes? A
second set of questions attends not to the character of the outcomes,
but rather to the character (or motives) of the people who perceive
those outcomes. Do there seem to be motives toward perceiving outcomes
as deserved rather than undeserved, and desirable rather than undesir-
abe? Is there as much concern about what other people receive as what
oneself receives? Are there indications that people are guided by a
moral sense of fairness or perhaps by a more base motive of self-interest?
By attempting to answer both of these general types of questions, a
more accurate picture of how people perceive the world and why they
perceive it as they do, may be obtained.
The present discussion is subdivided into the following areas:
the deservingness and desirability of outcomes, the recipients of
outcomes, perceiving control through perceiving justice, self-interest
versus morality, and methodological considerations and suggestions for
research.
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The Deservingness and Desirability of Outcome
It is assuring to see hardworking people receive their due
promotions and those with nohle intentions held in high estee..
.ike-
wise, it seems only right that lackadaisical workers remain in less
attractive positions and those with unkind intentions he held i„ dis-
respect, m one way or another these outcomes seem Just and deserved.
But what about the enthii<;iachT
j
thusiastic student who studies unrelentingly only
to receive a .ediocre grade, or the indifferent father who receives the
unconditional admiration of his son? Where is the fairness in these
types of Situations? Somehow these people do not see. to deserve what
they are getting. We are left with a feeling that things are not as
they should be; something is wrong; something must be changed.
Do people see their lives in this assuring light; where they
are more likely than not to get what they deserve? The results of the
present study indicate that just outcomes were reported as more likely
to occur than unjust outcomes (cf. Table 3. p. 54). In other words,
people were typically perceived as getting what they deserve.
As several writers have pointed out (e.g., Lerner, 1970; and
Rubin
,
Peplau, 1975), people are sometimes the recipients of deserved
and sometimes the recipients of undeserved outcomes. These writers note
that the incidence of undeserved suffering alone should verify the fact
that we do not live in a world where people necessarily get what they
deserve. Perhaps it is this fact that undeserved outcomes often do
occur, that the motivation to at least perceive the world as a just
place arises.
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Let us now consider the desirability of outcomes. Whether
an outcome is positive or negative seems to .5 Lj-ve be an even more basic
attribute than its deservin^^ness R,r ^ f ^ ^rvin^n . By definition, desirable outcomes
are preferred and undesirable ones rejected.
If we assume, as we did with the deservingness of outcomes, that
-tives may bias perceptions in ways which enhance the attractiveness of
the world, it would be expected that positive outcomes would be per-
ceived as more likely than negative ones. Indeed, our results demon-
strated that this was the case; positive outcomes were reported as
more likely to occur than negative ones (cf. Table 3, p. 54).
Given that both positive and negative outcomes can be either
deserved or undeserved, we can ask which of the outcome's aspects (i.e.,
its desirability or its deservingness) is more important than the
other. Our results indicated that the outcomes 's Justness was more
important than its Valence. More specifically, just-positive outcomes
were perceived as more likely than just-negative ones; but both of
these were perceived as more likely to occur than unjust outcomes of
either valence (JP > JN > UP = UN)
. According to these results, then, it
seems that individuals are more strongly motivated to perceive people
as getting deserved outcomes than perceiving than as necessarily
receiving positive ones.
A study performed by Schmitt and Harwell (1972) also indicates
that an outcome's deservingness may be more important that its valence.
They found that when subjects were given the opportunity to either
remain in an unjust situation with a relatively large reward or choose
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a situation where the outco.es were equitable hut s^^.
Chose the latter. Z„ other words, their suhjects were wilUns to fore.o
large outco.es In order to receive just outcomes. Let us now briefly
consider whether there are differences due to the person's perspective,
sex, or prlvilegedness.
Recipients of Outcomes
Do people in different positions and roles view outcomes in the
same ways or differently? In this section we will examine whether one's
own outcomes are viewed differently than the outcomes that others
receive. As we will see, perspective differences are closely tied to
the sex of the perceiver. Our discussion, therefore, will also compare
males and females. Finally, we will examine whether people from a
privileged sector of the American population perceive outcomes differ-
ently from those who are less fortunate.
Actors vs. observers. Do people perceive the world as more
just for themselves (i.e., actor's perspective) than for other people
(i.e., observer's perspective), or more just for others than for them-
selves? Previous research suggests that actors and observers often
differ in their perceptions. For example, it has been demonstrated that
actors tend to perceive their own behavior as situationally determined,
while observers perceive the behavior of others as dispositionally
(personally) initiated (e.g., Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Storms, 1973; and
Regan & Totten, 1975). These results suggest that actors see things as
happening to themselves rather than because of themselves. In contrast.
79
it appea.s that observe, perceive tM„,s as Kappeni„, ,e,^
than t, people. Of interest Here Is whether there are aetor-ohserver
differences, not in the perceived causes of hehavior, hut with respect
to the perceived causes of the outcomes that people receive.
At first glance, the results see. to indicate that an individ-
ual's perspective not be of „ajor importance. There was only a
trend to perceive oneself as receiving »ore
.ust and fewer unjust out-
comes than others (cf. Figure 3, p. 58). Further, the direction of this
trend was totally due to the responses of females (cf. Figure 4. p. 59).
Males reported no differences in the perceived likelihood of Justice
across the two perspectives. In contrast, females reported justice as
-ore likely for themselves than for others, and unjustlce more likely
for others than for themselves.
With respect to the valence of outcomes, it was found that
positive outcomes were perceived as more likely to occur than undesir-
able ones, regardless of whether oneself or some other was the
recipient (i.e.
,
PA = PO > NA = NO)
. Finally, the individual's perspec-
tive had no effect on the relative importance of the outcome's deserv-
ingness and desirability; both actors and observers perceived just
outcomes as more likely than unjust ones, especially when the just
outcomes were positive (i.e., JPA = JPO > JNA = JNO > UNO = UNA - UPO = UFA)
.
How do we account for the overall absence of an influence by
the individual's perspective? The possible argument that the different
instructions and items for the actor-observer perspectives were insuf-
ficient to induce the intended perspectives seems untenable; there was
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a significant perspective effect for females T.'l. •r x . Likewise, it cannot
simply be argued the JW hypothesis i.h.-.K, which contends the individual's
Perspecuve shoul.
...e no e„eet. accounts fo.
..e .esuUs. The £ac.
that fe^lea
.i,
.espon. a.„ere„U.
.espec. to tHe„3elve3 an.
others is con»ar.
.His Hypothesis. v.at „e di, and. Hoveve, was
an indication that differences rl„= idue to one's perspective may be closely
tied to the sex of the perceiver.
^^^i^^^^^^-Wes. Let us now turn to a brief review of the
results comparing „ales and fe^les. For the
.ost part, there were no
extensive differences between
.ales and fe^les. Both sexes perceived
Just outco.es as .ore likely than unjust ones. Also, positive outco.es
were reported as .ore likely than negative outco.es by both .ales and
females
.
In two instances, however, males and females did differ. First,
females had a tendency to perceive Just-negative outcomes as less likely
to occur than did males, while males tended to perceive undeserved out-
comes of either valence as more likely to occur than did females
(cf. Figure 5, p. 61). The second difference between males and females
brings us back to the perspective issue. Recall, males perceived
justice as equally likely to occur for others as for themselves. In
contrast, females reported that justice was more likely to occur for
themselves than for other people (cf. Figure 4, p. 59).
Privileged vs. underprivileged. Do fortunate people and those
less fortunate perceive their outcomes differently? To what extent do
diverse personal experiences accentuate perceptions that are assumed to
81
be influenced by motives. This section examines whether two groups
With differing backgrounds perceive their outco.es differently.
The backgrounds of our two samples differed extensively. The
annual household inco.es of the privileged respondents were in the
$12,000-16,000 range Ko^t of. M s their parents had completed college and
they were all In college themselves. In contrast, the annual incomes
of the underprivileged respondents were most often below $4,000. Most
of their parents and themselves had not completed high school. Although
these two samples perceived their own backgrounds differently, the
"perceived- differences were not as great as the "actual" differences
(cf. Table 1, p. 50). More specifically, the differences between the
••perceived" incomes and education levels were smaller than the differ-
ences between the "actual" incomes and education levels for the two
samples. These results are consistent with previous findings (e.g.,
Warner et al.
,
1949) that people tend to regard themselves toward the
middle ranges of socio-economic categories.
How do our two samples regard themselves with respect to the
justice in their lives? Although both samples perceived just outcomes
as more likely than unjust ones, the underprivileged sample did report
a greater occurrence of unjust outcomes than the privileged sample
(cf. Table 5, p. 62). Interestingly, the results were not symmetrical
with just outcomes perceived as less likely by underprivileged than by
privileged respondents.
The two samples differed in one other respect. The privileged
respondents perceived both themselves and others as more likely to be
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recipient, of positive than negative outcome.. The unde.p.iviiesed
respondents reported that positive outcomes „e.e .o.e li.el, tor then-
selves than negative outco.es „ere for others(cf. Table 5. p. e3). Mso
fro. Tahle 6 it can be seen that the underprlviledged sa.ple reported
a greater liUelihood of both positive and negative outco.es than did
the privileged sample. Surprisingly the underprivileged sa.ple reports
"ore positive outco.es than the privileged sa.ple. Perhaps these
differences are due to the higher perceived occurrence of unjust outco.es
(Which are al_so positive or negative outcomes) by the underprivileged
respondents; essentially, the high scores for positive and negative out-
comes by underprivileged respondents have been inflated by their high
scores for unjust outcomes.
In spite of these two differences between the privileged and
underpriviledged samples, one is left with the overall impression they
£erceive their outcomes similarly. First, both perceive just outcomes,
as more likely than unjust outcomes. Second, both samples perceive
people as more likely to be recipients of positive outcomes than nega-
tive ones. Third, males and females from both samples have comparable
results. More specifically, both privileged and underprivileged males
perceive justice as equally likely for themselves and for others, while
females from both samples report more justice for themselves than for
others
.
Given the results reviewed to this point, what can be inferred
about the motives that people may have? First, it is obvious that none
of the hypotheses provide an adequate account of the results. The Just
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world Hypothesis foun. suppo..
.
^^^^^^^^^^
Just than unjust outco.es. but was contradicted by the outcome's
valence also having an e„ect. I„ contrast, the SeH-Serving Hypothesis
was supported by positive outcomes bein, perceived as „ore li.ely than
negative outcomes, but not by Just outco.es perceived as
.ore liUely
than unjust ones. The Hedonistic Justice Hypothesis was upheld by the
higher perceived occurrences of Just outcomes and positive outco.es
than unjust and negative ones. Contrary to this hypothesis, however,
the deservingness of the outco.es see.ed to be .ore i.portant than
whether they were positive or negative. It is this last result which
invites speculation, and perhaps a way to integrate most of the data
found in the present study.
Perceiving Control Through Perceiving Justice
Overview. Our speculation here involves the possible relation-
ship between perceiving justice and perceiving control. Why should
people be motivated to perceive the world as a place where outcomes are
usually deserved outcomes? According to the JW and HJ hypotheses, a
"just world" is essentially a predictable world; a place where certain
outcomes tend to follow from certain inputs. Both theoretical (e.g.,
Festinger, 1954; and Heider, 1958) and empirical (e.g., Pervin, 1963;
and Lanzetta & Driscoll, 1966) literatures suggest that predictable
situations are preferred to unpredictable ones. Supposedly, being able
to predict events and outcomes implies an understanding of "how things
work;" given input X, outcome Y will follow. Perhaps, if one maintains
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:e re-
the belief of beine ahl^ jg b e to understand how the world works" ther.
suits the impression of being able to control it.
Kelley (1971b) has presented a iPi simxlar argument about control,
or at least the perception of control.
• • . attribution processp*; ar-o u
Bs a means ot provldinf^!! t '° ''^ understood, not only
View Of His JAZT.\Ti :,e ;r rL:;;^.:jranr"-
tion process, both the more and the iLs ratLnal (p 22^
If a
..,ust world" is one where the outcome Y is closely associated with
the input X, a "controllable world" is one where if I desire Y, I will
do the behavior (or demonstrate the attribute) X; but if I do not
desire Y, I .in not do the behavior (or eliminate the attribute) X.
In other words, a "just world" can be construed as a "controllable
world" where one can obtain desired outcomes and avoid undesired ones.
The essence of the present argument is that people are moti-
vated to perceive their outcomes as deserved because it also implies
they may be able to control these outcomes. Is there any evidence in
the present study that when outcomes are perceived as just they are
also perceived as controllable? Whenever one considers the Perceived
Likelihood and Locus of Causality data together, the evidence is rela-
tively convincing that when outcomes are perceived as just they also
tend to be perceived as controllable.
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If our reasoning is correct, since the respondents perceive
outco.es as .ore often Just than unjust, they should also perceive
to the.. It would also be expected that those who see the world as
highly just (High P.s) Should perceive greater control than those who
see the world as less Just (Low PJs)
. Indeed, the Locus of Causality
(LOG) data showed that respondents were
.ore liUely to .ake personal
attributions (i.e., perceive recipients as personally responsible for
their outco.es) than situational attributions (i.e., perceive environ-
.ental-uncontrollable-factors as the cause). Further, High PJs .ade
.ore personal and less situational causal attributions than Low PJs.
This desire for control interpretation provides a satisfying
explanation for the greater perceived likelihood of Just-negative out-
co.es over unjust-positive and unjust-negative ones. If a negative
outco.e is received and it is perceived as deserved, it should also be
perceived as changeable by altering the input. On the other hand, if
an outcome is perceived as unjust (i.e., not aligned with, or not a
function of. the input) there is little one can do to maintain it (in
the case of positive outco.es) or eliminate it (in the case of negative
outcomes). Clearly, it is to the individual's well being to perceive
outcomes as Just (and potentially controllabltO regardless of their
valence. As to why Just-positive outcomes were perceived as more
likely than Just-negative ones (JP > NJ)
, there is no readily available
answer. But, again, this is consistent with the LOC data which
indicated that people were perceived as more personally responsible for
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their posuiv. than their negative outcomes (c£. TaMe 9. p. 70).
TO suM.ri.e. in this section „e have attempted to tie together
the perception o. Justice and the perception of control. „e have noted
a consistent relationship hetween the perception of Justice and per-
ceiving people as personally responslhle for their outco.es: (1) j„3t
outcomes were reported as .ore likely than unjust ones the sa.e as
personal responsibility was chosen as „ore often the cause of an out-
come than environmental factors; (2, High PJs perceived people as .ore
personally responsible for their outco.es than Low PJs; and (3) as Just-
positive outco.es were perceived as .ore likely than just-negative ones
(JP>NJ), people were reported as .ore often responsible for their
positive than their negative outco.es. We .ust now ask whether this
Interpretation ren«lns viable when the perspective, sex, and privileged-
ness of the respondent is considered? Let us now direct the discussion
toward an examination of this issue.
Additional evidence
. As previously noted, there was no signifi-
cant differences between actors and observer on the Perceived Likeli-
hood .easures when males and fenales were considered together. That is,
the results indicated only a trend to perceive oneself as receiving
.ore just and fewer unjust outco.es than others. Similarly, the Locus
of Causality (LOC) data showed that actors and observers did not differ;
respondents reported themselves and others as equally responsible for
the outcomes they received (cf. Table 8, p. 68).
87
Recall, however,
.hat perspective differences were demonstrated
»he„ ^Xe and fe^ie respondents were compared.
..re speclflcaU..
males had no differences on t\.^ t>the Perceived Likelihood measures across
the two perspectives. In contract fo,. is , females perceived justice as more
likely for themselves than for others anH^ n , d injustice as more likely for
others than for themselves. If u is assumed that people perceive
control through perceiving outcomes as deserved, these results seem to
indicate that males perceive others as having relatively the same
amount of control over outcomes that they themselves have. Females, on
the other hand, seem to perceive themselves as having more control than
others. The LOG data lends support to this reasoning; females tended
to attribute more personal responsibility to then^selves for their own
outcomes than they assigned to others for their (of. Figure 6, p. 71).
It Is unlcear why males tended to report more personal responsibility
for others than for themselves (rather than the expected equal amounts)-
there is, however, a slight tendency for males to perceive justice as
more likely for others than for themselves.
If these results do indicate a greater perceived control of
outcomes by females for themselves than they perceive others as con-
trolling their outcomes, the reader may find these results contrary to
intuition. By returning to Figure 4 (p. 59) we find even more surprising
results. Although both male and female actors perceived just outcomes
as equally likely to occur, male actors perceived a greater incidence of
unjust outcomes than did female actors. This suggests a net effect that
males perceive less control over their own outcomes than females
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this con.en«on;
.e^.es
.en.ed
.o perceive U,,^
.3
.o.e pe.sln-
ally
.esponsiMe for
.heir outco.es than
.id .ales (c£. Pi.^^e S. p n,
These results are surprising i„ several respects. Pirst, t,ey
see. contrary to stereotyped beliefs about
.en and wo.en. The
.ale
role has been assu.ed to be .ore assertive and action-oriented than
that of the female. Parsons and Bales figss^ h.,lu D j.e uy35) have argued that males
are socialized into an "active" ml p. .r.^ frole and females into a "passive" role.
It is these types of stereotypic roles that the Women's Movement has
attempted to dispell; roles that are attributed to women not only by
iDen, but also by women to themselves.
A second reason these results are unexpected is because of
previous findings in the social psychological literature itself.
Feather (1969) reported that females scored higher in feelings of in-
adequacy and made more external attributions of causality than males.
Females also expressed lower initial confidence than males that they
would succeed in solving anagrams. Deaux et al. (1975) found that
males were more likely than females to play games of skill than games
of chance and luck. Furthermore, males persisted to play the skill
games longer than did females; perhaps males had greater confidence
that they would eventually be successful. In general, previous research
suggests that males perceive more control—or at least a greater
ability to achieve success—over their outcomes than do females.
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How can we account for the inconsistent results between the
present study, where females see. to perceive greater control than did
males over their outco.es, and the other data which indicates
.ales
perceive
.ore control? One difference between the present and the
other research is the type of situations fro. which the daca was
Obtained. The other studies see.ed to use situations or tasks which
could be viewed as ".asculine" in nature. For exa.ple, Feather's
(1969) subjects worked on a "proble.-solving task;" Wyer et al. (I975)
had people respond to "achieve.ent situations;" and Feldman et al.
(1974) had subjects respond with respect to an "intellectual task". If,
as Horner (1972) has suggested, fe.ales actively avoid success in .ale
dominated tasks and situations, it would be expected that they would
rate themselves as being less competent or having less control in these
types of situations than would .ales. On the other hand, it would be
expected that females would view themselves as more competent, or
having greater control, on "feminine" tasks.
Were the sex differences in the present study an artifact of
the types of situations represented on the questionnaire? A brief
examination of some of the items were made in order to test this possib-
ility. Although the items, for the most part, see. relatively free to
sex-typing, two ite.s which could .ost likely be perceived as
"masculine" (items on school grades and traffic accidents) and two as
"feminine" (items on love and consideration) were examined. Males and
females did not differ across the two types of items. That is, the
males' perceived likelihood ratings were the same for themselves and
and for others across both •Wcullne" aod "fe.inine" Ue.s. Pe^ales
Showed comparable ratings across the Items categorize. In t,.e two
genders. In conclusion, it seems unlikely the sex H^fftj.j.^ej.y cn differences wore
an artifact of the Items used on the questionnaire.
If these sex differences are not a function of characteristics
inherent In the Items. It seems appropriate to examine
.ore closely the
Characteristics of the respondents themselves. Rather than going far
afield to account for these differences between males and females, It
is believed that some data In the present study may at least partially
clarify this issue.
Recall, the data on background characteristics indicated a few
differences between the .ale and female respondents used in this study.
One difference, however, seems particularly interesting; females per-
ceived themselves as having more opportunity to live satisfying lives
than did males (Table 1, p. 50). More specifically, females perceived
themselves as having "... somewhat more opportunities than the
•average' person.
.
."to live a satisfying life. Males reported ".
. .
about the same number of opportunities as the 'average' person ..."
to live a satisfying life.
Let us assume that the perception of more opportunities for a
satisfying life is in some way related to perceiving greater opportunity
to exert control and choice over one's outcomes. After all, if there
is a perceived control of outcomes, one would be expected to maximize
those outcomes which bring the most satisfaction and minimize those
which would bring the least. If this assumption is correct, it would be
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expected that females would report fhpn,=oit emselves as more likely than others
(I.e., the "average" person) to receive ^u^t ^ .j s outcomes and less likely
than others to receive
.njust outcomes. Also, since n,ales perceive
their opportunities about the sa.e as the
..averase" person, they should
report the occurrence of Justice as roughly comparable for themselves
and for others. These results were In fact obtained (cf. Table 4,
p. 56). With respect to the LOG data, it would be expected that fe.ale
actors would assume
.ore personal responsibility for their outcomes
than would male actors. The LOC data indicated a strong trend in the
predicted direction (cf. Figure 6 n 71^ v-t nV r b, p. 71). Finally, the positive rela-
tionship between perceived opportunity and Perceived Justice (i.e.,
PJ Scores) is indicated by a small but significant correlation between
these two scores for privileged respondents (r =
.18; p < .05). Al-
though there is no significant correlation between these two scores
for the underprivileged respondents, the relationship is in the pre-
dieted direction.
Although the sex differences in perceived opportunities pro-
vides at least a speculative basis for understanding the sex differences
on the perceived likelihood and LOC data, how do we account for these
perceived opportunity differences? It cannot be argued the results
were true for one sample but not the other; both privileged and under-
privileged females say themselves as having more opportunity to live
a satisfying life than the "average" person. Likewise, there were
parallel results on the perceived likelihood and LOC data for respondents
of both samples when analyzing their perspective and sex. The sex dif-
ferences are obviously not tied to socio-economic differences. It is
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intere.U„.
.„ „„.e.
.ow.ver.
.Hat a vast „a,o.u.
^/^.^
respondent. „e„ u„^„,e.. Pe.Haps Betnara's
„,3e„atio„s that
single females are more c5oHo4^-f^j • ,satisfied wxth their lives than married females.
and single males are more dissatTsf<=H ta i ied than married ones, provides a
starting point for further speculation.
So far, „e have noted a parallel in results between the per-
ceived likelihood and LOC data whenever the respondent's perspective
and sex „ere considered. Let us briefly examine whether the comparison
of privileged and underpriviledged respondents continues to lend
support to the notion that perceiving outcomes as deserved may indicate
they are also perceived as controllable.
The most interesting difference between the two samples was the
finding that underprivileged respondents reported a greater occurrence
of unjust outcomes than did the privileged respondents. These results
suggest that underprivileged people may sense less control over their
outcomes than more privileged people. As would be predicted, the LOC
data indicated that underprivileged respondents had a strong tendency
to perceive people as less often personally responsible for their
outcomes than did privileged respondents (cf. Table 9, p. 70). In line
with this. Rotter (1966) has reported that people from lower socio-
economic levels perceive their outcomes (rewards) as more externally
controlled than people from higher socio-economic levels.
Throughout this section it has been argued that outcomes are
typically perceived as deserved because it implies those outcomes may
be controlled. Evidence reviewed has shown a parallel between perceiving
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the„ as c„„..onable. By hig.HshUng t.e Iss.e of con..ol a „ore
satisfying and parsimonious explanation of t.e data Is provided than ,y
either tHe Hedonistic Justice,
.nst World, or Self-Serving Hypotheses.
Self-interest Versus Morality
Throughout this discussion section the argument has been
presented that the perception of justice and the perception of control
are closely bound together. The assumptions have been made that a
"just outcome" is one that is aligned with (or follows from) a given
input, and a "controllable outcome" is one that changes when the input
is changed. Thus, if one maintains the belief that inputs and outcomes
are typically aligned, one should also believe that changing the inputs
will lead to changes in outco.es. Obviously, it is in the individual's
own interest to (believe that he can) attain desirable outcomes and
avoid negative ones by changing inputs.
But has this analysis taken a biased view of people? Perhaps
It is not the motive to control outcomes which leads to the desire to
perceive justice, but rather a motive to see the world as a fair place.
In other words, there may be little or no self-interest involved, but
rather a desire to see some ::iLifAej-:: jnoraJ^prl^^ attained. Indeed,
Schwartz (1975) has argued that altruistic acts, sacrifices, and self-
less expressions of benevolence are indicators of "Humanitarian Norms."
There may be people who organize their lives around principles
which have a "true" moral base, or at least believe themselves to be
doing such—after all, the attainment of that desired moral principle
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probably behave in „a.s that
actually costumes to disguise self-l„terest
. The 1-ent b <in i.^en , here, Is not
to depict man as a deceptive creature, rather Itl. •, icitne , it is society that
designs these costumes In the forms of laws rules ^.n •Ldws,, , religions, etc.
for people to „eat. Balet (1975) „.l„tal„s that
.o.al principles exist
only wbete people live In societies where there are established ways o£
behavior. He writes
The answer to our question, "why should we be
-oral^"
-f.
all.e that such rules sllu 11 ^e^eJaln^ll^.T^29,
.
At this point is see„,s useful to .akc the distinction between
short-ter. self-interest and long-ter. self-interest. A person who Is
operating under a short-ter» self-interest wants l„.edlate gratifica-
tion; that is, there Is a resistance to forego present desirable out-
comes and/or endure present undesirable ones for greater and more
desirable outcomes at some future time. In contrast, with long-term
self-interest there Is a sacrifice during the present for a bounty at
some later time. For e>cample, work hard now (input) so that you will
get a better job (outcome); save your money (Input) in order that you
retire In comfort (outcome), or the meek (Input) shall Inherit the
earth (outcome). In spite of the fact that long-tern self-interest Is
in one's self-interest, we are left with an impression that society
regards it as more virtuous or admirable (i.e., "moral") than short-
term self-interest.
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Why Should societies advocate long-te™ over short-te™ self-
interest, and how does this relate to the Issue of justice. Briefly
a Place where everyone pursued only i^edlate gains, followed every
whi». or had no regard for future co„se,ue„ces, would he unpredictable
Chaotic, and anarchic. Obviously, the society's survival Is at sta.e
in such a disruptive atmosphere- it ic= rh^^^fn , s, therefore, in its advantage to
encourage long-ter„ self-interest. To „aUe long-ter. self-interest
appear viable, however, people .ust also believe that society functions
in a just manner. That Is, m order for people to delay l,„.edlate
gratifications for lareer oupq a^ ^x g nes at a future time, they must believe that
people do indeed eventually get what they deserve-justice.
In summary, it has been argued that what may appear to be
morally based behavior, may in fact be "disguised" self-interest. The
disguise lies in the delay of the gratifications. Further, it was
suggested that this delay is encouraged by society to help maintain it-
self, and that believing the world to be a just place provides a viable
"reason" as to why it is feasible to delay gratifications.
Methodological Considerations and Future Research
In this section we will briefly discuss a few issues which may
render some aspects of the present study questionable. In doing so, the
problem will be stated, the viability of the criticism reviewed, and
possible improvements suggested.
research
Perhaps the most conspicuous criticism of""""^ ° the present
.....^ n
couecuon. XHe e„,lo..e„. o.
,.es..o„„a..es
.,p,..n. „,3es so™e
longstanding questions: (l) did thp r-o. ^U; e respondents indicate their true
^eUe.s on .He ,.e.Uo„„a..es o. „e.e .He..
_e.s
....ep.ese„...,.„.
Of wha.
.Hey acuall, HeUeve; (2) „e.e .He.e so„e
.Hln,.
the <,ues..o„„a..e-.a.ing session. „HicH encou.asea one „a. of
.espond-
ing over so.e o.Her ways; (3) would si.Ua.
.esul.s be found if dif-
ferent i.e^s were used; and (4) do people in
.Heir ever^ n..s
actually perceive
.he world as represen.ed by our resul.s?
Al.hough „ore questions could be raised,
.hey would „os. llUelv
also indicate tha.
.He issues at Hand are those of the questionnaire's
internal and external validity. The present study. However, is no „cre
subject to such critlcls.
.han .os. ques.ionnaire research, or for .ha.
ma..er. so.e laboratory (or experimental) research. In fact,
.Here are
cerrain fea.ures in .his s.udy which a..e,np.
.o „ini„i.e
.he possibiU^
of such criticisms. Firs., all .he Perceived Likelihood (PL) i.ems were
ra.ed by judges. These ra.ings indicate the extent to which each item
describes just or unjust si.ua.ions (see Appendix VI). From these
judges' ratings it is clear tha. the just items describe jus. events
and the unjust items describe unjust events. Further, this is .rue for
Items which have positive ou.comes and for those which have negative out-
comes across both actor and observer perspectives. Secondly, in order
to account for the possibill.y
.Ha. the PL ra.lng of any i.em was
unique .o the theme (e.g., grades in school, receiving consideration)
Of tha. U.., each the^e was sys.e:.UcaU, varied in Us aust„e,s
valence, and Perspective. Thus. ,or each of
.he twelve
.he.es
.heL
were eight variations (see p. 42) ThirH <= •H^;. i d, since there were 96
different events represented in the studv . o un y (i.e., 12 themes x 8 varia-
tions of each theme), there iq nhT7-fo..^i
,
cn s obviously more generalizability than if
only a few situations were representpH • .ed, as is true in most laboratory
research.
In sugary, although the present study Is subject to the typical
criticises levied against questionnaire-type research, there are certain
features about this study which argue for the viability of the .ethcd
employed
.
Other potential criticisms lie in the comparison of the privi-
leged and underprivileged samples. On a methodological level, it may be
argued that the use of two translations, English and Spanish, led to
the samples having different results. That is, the sample differences
were in the translation of the items themselves and not a function of
different beliefs between the two samples. Recall, however, it was
previously reported that no significant differences were found between
the Hispanic people which took the Spanish version of the questionnaire
and the Hispanic people which reponded to the English version (see
p. 47). This suggests that the sample differences were not due to
translation differences.
Again comparing samples, on a more interpretive level however,
we cannot confidently conclude the samples differ solely because of
differences in their privilegedness. The samples also differed on
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ra«o.s
..eh .s c.Uu„X
.ae.,„™a.
„,^, ^^^^^^^^^^
to ,ueseic„„at.e3. Pu.eher.
.He u„ae.p.,vUesea
.esponden.s
„e.e paid
two dollars for their services whii^ ^K, le the college students were given
experimental credits Tn i-jok*- ^ ,. I light of these differences between the two
samples, in addition to differences in • •l m their pnvilegedness
, it seems
we must remain reserved in our conclusions.
'
A third area of possible criticism involves the relationship
between the Perceived Likelihood (PL) items and the Locus of Causality
(LOO items. Recall, the results indicated that increasing perceptions
of Justice by respondents were associated with increasing attributions
of personal (rather than situational) responsibility. The fact that
the 12 PL items on each questionnaire had the same_it_em_th^ (e.g.,
grades in school, traffic accidents, etc.) as the 12 LOG items may bl
an issue of concern. It is possible the respondents attempted to align
their responses on the LOG items with those on the PL items. For
example, if the respondents rated the "people who give love" are highly
likely to "receive love" on the PL item, they may have felt that in order
to be consistent, they should choose the alternative that the "people
had given love themselves," rather than the alternative that "others
are quite often affectionate" on the LOG item. This attempt to be con-
sistent from the PL to the LOG items, however, is only a criticism if
the respondents had formed an hypothesis, and were basing their answers
on this hypothesis.
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There are several ways to ell.l.ate the above problem. One
obvious method would be to h^^ro ^ iave a long time interval between respond-
ing to the PL items and the LOC items. Such a time interval would
reduce the possibility of recalling earlier responses, and thus make
it more difficult to be consistent from the PL to the LOC items. A
second, and perhaps better method, would be to use differen^^
themes in the PL section of the questionnaire than ^I^T^^^^.e
LOC portion. This method would eliminate any attempt to be consistent
from one set of items to the other, because there would be nothing to
have to be consistent with. A third method, similar to the second,
would be to replace the LOC items with a scale, such as Collins' (1974)
I-E scale, whose measures are conceptually comparable to the LOC items.
Throughout this discussion it has been argued that in order
for people to maintain the belief that outcomes can be controlled, they
must also believe that inputs and outcomes are typically aligned. In a
sense we have placed the motive for control of outcomes in a more
Important position than the motive to perceive outcomes as deserved;
that is, in order to make the possibility for control more viable, the
belief that outcomes are typically deserved is adopted.
The order of control first and justice second is merely assumed.
One could argue for the opposite order in which the primary motive is
to perceive inputs and outcomes as appropriately aligned, and the
secondary result is that they are thereby perceived as controllable. A
third possibility is that one does not affect the other in any direct
manner, but that respondents who perceive outcomes as typically
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per-
t
ep in
o
ce
deserved also perceive people as tvu<„,-,f P ypically personally responsible for
their outcomes. The aa.a fro. the present study sHows a positive
correlation between perceivins responsibility (.oc scores) and per-
ceiving justice (PL scores). TherpWoJ' i erefore, we can only conclude that
,
ceptions of control and justice tPnHe d to vary together, and not tha
there is any causal link between the two Th. . v •Ln . e next obvious st
research is to experimentally manipulate the perception of control t
examine the changes in the perceived likelihood of justice, and vi
versa. Such research should provide a clearer picture of the causal
link (if any exists) between the two.
Finally, our discussion has focused on the control of outcomes
It has been argued that outcoj^s are perceived as changeable when the
inputs are changed. There is an entirely new issue, however, when one
considers whether or not inEuts are perceived as controllable, lor
example, to what extent do people perceive their behavior as being
under personal versus situational control (cf. Jones S Nisbett, 1971)?
Also, are one's attributes such as good or bad intentions and envy or
sympathy perceived as being under personal control? It seems evident
that the extent to which the inputs are viewed as controllable or not
should influence the extent to which outcomes are perceived as under
personal control.
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APPENDIX IIA
ENGLISH VERSION OF PERCEIVE LIKELIHOOD ITEMS
CONDITION
1. JPA
JNA
UPA
UNA
ITEM
JPO
JNO
UPO
UNO
2. JPA
JNA
UPA
UNA
UPA
UNA
JPO
JNO
When I don't ieseZ tllor.tZ "^"^'"y ""^^ive them,
usually recelve lhaf
^^l^-^^ons, I nevertheless
""Suallt^cf
-ee^Ihe™'^™""^ evaluations. I nevertheless
When^people deserve favorable evaluations they usually receive
""^^c^-eft\er"^^ """-""''^ ^^^y usually
"theK:f:sl°!;^ f™- —ions, they never-
":e"v^«h^^Lsr:Lfi!r-
''elr:;^^ :oo"d1ort::^!'" '
"^^^
--"^
-""""B to
"to ea™ 2"lTf ' '^''"^ """-^ somethingto rn my misfortune.
If I have "lucky breaks," I have usually done nothing toearn my good fortune.
unm
''earn'mv li'f'I^' ' "^^^^^^ -^hing toy m s ortune.
JPA If I drive carefully, I am less likely to get hurt in
JNA Tf T / ^^^^dents than if I drive carelessly.
JJf"''"
carelessly, I am more likely to get hurt intraffic accieents than if I drive carefully.
If I drive carelessly, I am no more likely to get hurt intraffic accidents than if I drive carefully
If I drive carefully, I am no less likely to get hurt intraffic accidents than if I drive carelessly.
"^^^r^?f^'"'''^
carefully, they are less likely to get hurtin traffic accidents than if they drive carelessly
If people drive carelessly, they are more likely to get hurtin traffic accidents than if they drive carefully
n
^0^°""^
^
'
^ ^'^""'^ P (Positive)
0 (Observer) u (Unjust) n (Negative)
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CONDITION
ITEM
UPO
UNO
4. JPA
JNA
UPA
UNA
UPO
UNO
JPA
JNA
UPA
UPO
JNO
UNO
6. JPA
JNA
UPA
UNA
UPO
JNO
UPO
UNO
If people drive carelesqiv
""iLldr'-''' -hool, U was UUel, I Had
"^A^Z^t/:^^ " —less
Wlien students receive high sraHPQ n„ i • .
theless still u„llUely1,rh::e^:,:^ • " -—
cneless still likely they have studied.
By and larire T rfnn'f j ^..^"5= ..u<.l nappen to me.
"NA By and larS" I don't d^^!"' f "^^PP™y o rge, eserve the bad things that happen to me.
By and llllV HZ]" f '^an happen to them.
OPO iy lllll' IZll tl'll
"--i 'hings that happen to them.
to them ""^ '"^"8= ">at happen
'"trther''' '^^""^ ^^"i 'Ki^S- that happeno t m.
When my parents rewarded me, it was typically for good reasonsWhen my parents punished me, it was typically for ^ood rea.sonsWhen my parents rewarded me, it was rarely for good reasonsWhen my parents punished me, it was rarely for good reasons."
When parents punish their children, it is typically for good
reasons. b^^^
When parents punish their children, it is typically for good
When parents reward their children, it is rarely for good
reasons. ^
When parents punish their children, it is rarely for good
reasons
.
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CONDITION
ITEM
7. JPA
JNA
UPA
UNA
JPO A person's pood deedc: o-ro
JNO A person's misdeeds are oftfn'"
ro..rie6.
roo A person's misdeeds all JlT Punished.
A person's
.ood LLr! °' unpunished.UNO
JPO
JNO
JPO
JNO
UPO
UNO
JNA
UPA
UNA
JPO
JNO
UPO
UNO
:o:^i^:dr:rr^Sen~"eVr r---i-tin unnoticed and unrev/arded.
g deeds are often unno^iLd and^'^^;,.
Oft'e'n 'l':u?fer th'^^^' f'^^^^^^ °^ "^-^
UPA Often j\ f rough faults of my own.
UNA OftPn T ^° endeavors of my owne I suffer through no faults of my oJn
JNA
UPA
UNA
JPO
JNO
UPO
UNO
^'
jlt Yfj f M f '^'"^^ "^"^^ly so well for me.
UNA If l' llll Ihead tMn" '
"'^^"^
"^^^ - -y^ow.P an a , hings rarely go well for me anyhow
If people plan ahead, things usually go well for them.
f peop : i: 'i^^ t^^^'
^^^^^^^ ^'^^-^'^ 1^--
anyhow! " '^'^^^ "^""^l^ g« them
If people plan ahead, things rarely go veil for them anyhow.
TM^ H 1 ^^^^ 1°^^' I generally receive love.If I withhold love, I rarely receive love
If I withhold love, I nevertheless generally receive love.If I give love, I nevertheless rarely receive love.
If people give love, they generally receive love.
If people withhold love, they rarely receive love.
If^people withhold love, they nevertheless generally receive
If people give love, they nevertheless rarely receive love.
11. JPA When I am honest, I usually get my way.
When I am "sneaky," I rarely get my way.
When I am "sneaky," I usually get my way.
When I am honest, I nevertheless rarely get my way.
When people are honest, they usually get their way.
When people are "sneaky," they rarely get their way.
When people are "sneaky," they usually get their way.
When people are honest, they nevertheless rarely get their way,
CONDITION
12. JPA
JNA
UPA
UNA
JPO
JNO
UFO
UNO
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ITEM
When I am considerate, I typicallv
returned. '^YPica y have my consideration
When I am inconsiderate, I typicallv
returned. ^^YPical y have my inconsideration
When I am inconsi fl^T-at-^ t
inconslderaMo"
^eJunUd
"^""'"^l"
-^"-Iv have „y
""s^^dLa^ri^r^^^^^::!- ^ --^-^l-^ -^ly have co„-
'"^<^.^oir:^'^' '—1^ have .he..
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CONDITION
1. JPA
JNA
UPA
UNA
JPO
JNO
UPO
UNO
2. JPA
JNA
UPA
UNA
JPO
JNO
UPO
UNO
3. JPA
JNA
APPENDIX IIB
SPANISH VERSION OF PERCEIVE LIKELIHOOD ITEMS
ITEM
Cua„do^.ere.co favorables evaluaclones usual^ente yo las
Cuando^«rezco desfavcrables evaluaclones usual„e„te yo las
" iriJlelll:° ^^^or.^les evaluaclones no^al^nte
'
lilt: t: ITs rlllT''
'esfavorables evaluaclones no^al-
"^'lllTsl flTlllllT '""^^ evaluaclones cuando
":uf:dr:iKr:fi::'!^::;^" -sfavo.aMes evaluadones
favorables evaluaclones las siguen recibiendo.
desfavorable " T"' ^^"'^^ ^ "^^^ -s evaluaclones las siguen recibiendo.
^'al'KrD;r?r"-- Porque yo he hecho±go para ganarmela.
^'alsfn^r?!""^-'"'r'"
^°"^^l"^^^te es porque yo he hechoso para ganarmela.
''ganSfLla"'"
"^^^^^^"^^^^^
"° he hecho nada para
''ganifLla!''
"^^'^^'^^^^^
-° ^e hecho also para
Si las gentes tienen "buenen suerte" normalmente es porque
eilos han hecho algo para ganirsela.
Si las gentes tienen "mala suerte" normalmente es porque
eilos han hecho algo para ganarsela.
Si las gnetes tienen "buenea suerte" normalmente no han hecho
nada para ganarsela.
Se las gentes tienen "mala suerte" normalmente no han hecho
nada para ganarsela.
Si conduzco con cuidado, las probabilidades de herlrme en
los accidentes de tr^fico son menos que si conduzco sin
cuidado
.
Si conduzco sin cuidado^, las probabilidades de herirme en
los accidentes de trafico son mds que si conduzco sin
cuidado
.
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CONDITION
UPA
UNA
JPO
JNO
UPO
UNO
4. JPA
JNA
UPA
UNA
JPO
JNO
UPO
UNO
ITEM
5. JPA
JNA
UPA
JPO
JNO
UPO
UNO
Si conduzco sin cuidado, las nrnK^K^i-j ^
los accidentes de traaco son if ^ ^""^^""^^
cuidado. ° guales que so conduzco con
son iguales que si conduzco sin cuidado.
'\".i.sT:ri:r^:ciin™
^":^ikc^r -
conducen sin cuidado ° «i ^11°3
cuidado.
franco son mas que si conducen con
"h^^L^r^ri^rfc-de^j^r?^ia^r ----- de
conducen con cuidado ^^"^^^
''he^LrerioTfr^:; probabiUdades de
sin cuidado ^^^^^^^ ^-^ico son iguales que si conduce,
'"^orqur^^^idif"^^ --^^^ Probablemente fue
'r;rnffstud?l.^°^^^ --^^^ probable.en.e fue
Cuando estaba en la escuela, recibla buenas notas a pesarde que probablemente no estudiaba. ^
Cuando estaba en la esrupl^i T-oo?k-!"^ i
, , V
cueia, recibia malas notas a oesarde que probablemente estudiaba. ^
Cuando los estudiantes reciben buenas notas en la escuela esporque probable ellos had estudiado
i
Cuando los estudiantes reciben malas notas en la escuela esporque probable ellos no hayan estudiado.
Los estudiantes reciben buenas notas en la escuela a pesarde que probablemente no hayan estudiado.
Los estudiantes reciben malas notas en la escuela a pesarde que probablemente que han estudiado.
Generalmente. yo me merezco las cosas buenas que me pasan.
Sr:! ^'^^'^'^ ^-.--^ ^ue me pasan.
UNA l:T:r:]:::iv i: !:!!!!^° - pasan,. —" ^v^vjoio wuciido que ine nGeneralmente, yo no me merezco las cosas malas que me pasan.
Generalmente, las gentes se merecen las cosas buenas que lespasan,
Generalmente, las gentes se merecen las cosas malas que lespasan. ^
Generalmente, las gentes no se merecen las cosas buenas queles pasan.
Generalmente, las gentes no se merecen las cosas malas queles pasan.
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CONDITION
;:6. JPA
JNA
UPA
UNA
JPO
JNO
UPO
UNO
7. JPA
JPO
JNO
UPO
UNO
8. JPA
UNA
UPA
UNA
JPO
JNO
UPO
UNO
ITEM
Cuando mis padres me premiaron ^ • •
razones.
P era tipicamente por buenas
'"™s! '^'^'^ tipicamente por buenas
"T.ti:l: ^^^^^^-^ ™nte por buenas
Cuando^.i3 padres me castigaron era raramente por buenas
'"buetas°?aL':r
'^^^'^^
^ ^^^^ ^ ^^P^—te por
'"buetas^LLtr ^^"-'^^^ ^ - ^^Pi— e por
"as^^a^^n^r
^^^^"^
^ ^^^^ ~-e por
'rfLs^^aL^ne^r
^'^^^^^^^
^ ^^^^ ^™- Por
'1 pre^mL'do:?'^^ frequentamente son notados
'^ni^^as^tigrdor
frecuentamente no son notados
'^ni^a^tiSdo:? frequentamente no son notados
'^^i'p™':s'°^ "^^^ ^^^^^^^ fre.uentamente no son notados
Yo frequentamente me beneficio a travels de mis propios esfuer.osYo frequentamente sufro a traves de mis propias faltas.Yo frequentamente me beneficio sin mis propios
Yo frequentamente sufro sin haber cometido ninguna falta.
Las gentes frequentamente se benifician a travels de suspropios esfuerzo.
Las gentes frequentamente sufren a traves de sus propias faltasLas gentes frequentamente se benefician sin sus propios
esfuerzo.
Las gentes frequentamente sufren sin causa de sus propias faltas.
^*
™t
adelanto mis trabajos usualmente estos me salen bien.JNA Si yo no adelanto mis trabajos estos raramente me salen bien.UPA A pesar de que yo adelanto mis trabajos estos normalmente me
salen bien.
UNA A pesar de que yo adelanto mis trabajos estos raramente me
salen bien.
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CONDITION
ITEM
JPO
JNO
UPO
UNO
10. UFA
JNA
UFA
UNO
11. JPA
JNA
UFA
JPO
JNO
UFO
UNO
12. JPA
JNA
UFA
UNA
JPO
-ual.ente estos les
SI yo doy amor generalmente reclbo amor.
UNA A pesar de fLT?al:~: "e^rlLr!""
^0 s'i tTrZ Seneralmente reclben amor.
Lor. ' =^ I"""-" amor generalmente reclben
A pesar de que las gentes dan amor raramente reclben amor.
Cuando soy honesto usualmente conslgo lo que deseo
WA A ^esa^r^^ 11711'° --^8° 1° - o
UNA A pesar de ser ho^^" "^"^l"^"- <=°"-lg° lo que deseo.« onesto raramente conslgo lo que deseo.
'"desean?'
'""'"^'^ usualmente conslguen lo que
'"esean!'
"^""""""^ raramente conslguen lo que
' ToZe'lZV:' '""^-^ conslguen
qurde^ean" '^""-'^ —l?-" 1°
'"::n:id:L"-n"^"^^'^
'^-^^^
'"::s:o::Le:::°":"^"'^
A pesar de que soy desconslderada con los dema's raramente
recibo desconsideraclon.
' ToTslLllV:' raramente recibo
^f' -r'^^
son considerados unas con otras tipf-camenteeiias leciben consideracion mutualmente.
JNO Cuando las gentes son desconsiderados unas con otras tipfcamente
eiios reciben desconsideraclon mutualmente.
A pesar de que las gentes son desconsideradas unas con otras
raramente ellos devuelven desconsideraclon mutualmente.
UPO
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CONDITION
• ITEM
UNO
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APPENDIX IIIA
ENGLISH VERSION OF ATTRIBUTED LOCUS OF CAUSALITY ITEMS
CONDITION
1. PA
NA
PO
NO
2. PA
NA
PO
NO
3. PA
NA
PO
NO
ITEM
'^r/.sZr.Tj"'' evaluations, it Is typicall, because
Others generally give me the benefit of the doubt
^raes:rvriher'^™""^ evaluations. It Is .yll.^^y because
Others rarely give me the benefit of the doubt.
When^people are given favorable evaluations. It is typically
They deserve them.
others generally give them the benefit of the doubt.
Wause?" ble evaluations, it is typically
They deserve them.
Others rarely give them the benefit of the doubt.
^Of lu^^^^ ^""^^^'^^ '^^y ^^"^ t° ^^PPe^ becausethings beyond my control.
Of something I have done.
When I have "unlucky breaks" they tend to happen becauseUt things beyond my control.
Of something I have done.
When people have "lucky breaks" they tend to happen becauseUt things beyond their control.
Of something they have done.
When people have "unlucky breaks" they tend to happen becauseUt things beyond their control.
Of something they have done.
If I avoid traffic accidents, it would be most likely becauseOf the improved safety designs on new highways.
I ara a careful driver.
If I have traffic accidents, it would be most likely because
Of the failure to improve safety designs on new highways.
I am not always a careful drive.
If people avoid traffic accidents, it would be most likely
because
Of the improved safety designs on new highways.
They are careful drivers.
If people have traffic accidents, it would be most likely
because
Of the failure to improve safety designs on new highways.
They are careless drivers.
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CONDITION
ITEM
4. PA If I got high grades in school it wnnl^ v
I had studied my subjects ^ ^^'^""^
The grading standards were easy.V^^J^ i; "oul. Be Because
The grading standards were difficult.
The grading standards are difficult
The grading standards are difficult.
"^GooHr baffb-'^'T '° is typically because
ThLl\ t ^ ^^PP^" regardless of what I do.i have worked to attain them.
"""ood'or'bad't'h'''''? '° ^^P-^l^y ^™G or bad t ings happen regardless of what I doI haven't tried hard enough.
"^Goofor bad"?h-'''T '° ^^P-^^^^ood o d things happen regardless of what they do.Tney have worked to attain them.
'^Good'or'!;^d'^.'''''K
'° ^'^P'^' typically because
or bad things happen regardless of what they do.They haven't tried hard enough.
6. PA As a child, I was rewarded because
Generally speaking, I was well behaved.
My parents felt obligated to reward me.NA As a child, I was punished because
Generally speaking, I was not well behaved.
My parents felt obligated to discipline me.
PO Children are rewarded because
Generally speaking, they are well behaved.
People feel obligated to reward their children.
NO Children are punished because
Generally speaking, they are not well behaved.
Parents feel obligated to discipline their children.
7. PA If my deeds are rewarded, it is probably because
Other people are typically kind to me.
I am in some way deserving.
NA If my deeds are unrewarded, it is probably because
Other people are typically self-centered.
I am in some way undeserving.
NA
PO
NO
5. PA
NA
PO
NO
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CONDITION
ITEM
PO
NO
8. PA
NA
PO
NO
9. PA
NA
PO
NO
NA
NO
They are deserving.
iney are undeserving.
When I benefit, it is typically because
I have done the right things.
Of a lucky streak.
When I suffer, it is typically because
i have done the wrong things.
Of an unlucky streak.
When people benefit, it is typically because
Ihey have done the right things.
Of a lucky streak.
When people suffer, it is typically because
Ihey have done the wrong things.
Of an unlucky streak.
When things go well for me, it is most likely becausebood luck happened to prevail.
I planned ahead.
"^Bad'wf "''^ li^^ly becauseiiad luck happened to prevail.
I did not plan ahead.
When things go well for people, it is most likely becausebood luck happened to prevail.
They planned ahead.
When things do not go well for people, it is most likely becauseHad luck happened to prevail.
They did not plan ahead.
10. PA If I receive love, it is probably because
Others are quite often affectionate.
I have given love myself.
If I do not receive love, it is probably because
Others are not usually affectionate
They had given love themselves.
If people do not receive love, it is probably because
Others are not usually affectionate.
They had not given love themselves.
11. PA Whenever I get my way, it is most likely because
I have been fair to others.
Getting my way is often a matter of good luck.
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CONDITION
m
PC
NO
12. PA
ITEM
NA
PO
NO
Whenever I fail to get n.y way, it is mostly becauseI have not been fair to others
t)ecau
Not getting my way is often a matter of bad luck.
Whenever people get their wav, it is mostlv K..They have been fair to others ^
^"'^
Getting your way is often a matter of good luck
Not getting your way is often a matter of bad luck.
T""""^^
"^^'^ consideration, it is probably becauseI have been considerate to others
People tend to care about other people.
l\Z T^"^*? ''"'^ inconsideration, it is probably becauseI have been inconsiderate to others o
People tend to look out only for themselves.
'^Th^v'^i' ^'k
"''^ consideration, it is probably becauseey have been considerate to others.
People tend to care about other people
^\lTJl^ ^"t ''^^'^^ ^'-'^ inconsideration, it is probably becauseThey have been inconsiderate to others.
People tend to look out only for themselves.
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APPENDIX IIIB
SPANISH VERSION OF ATTRIBUTED LOCUS OF CAUSALITY ITEMS
CONDITIONS
1. PA
ITEMS
Otras ine dan ocasion a la duda.
Cuando recibo evaluaciones desfavorables t±Bicam^r^t.-.Yo las inerezco.
""oxes. ipicamente es porque.
Otras no me dan ocasi6n a la duda.
iTforiT evaluaciones favorables, tipicamente
Ellas las merecen.
Otras generalmente les dan ocasion a la duda
eTTovqlT
evaluaciones desfavorables
, tipicamente
Ellas las merecen.
Otras normalmente no les dan ocasion a la duda.
2. PA Cuando tengo "buena suerte," suele sucederme por
Cosas que estan fuera de mi control.
Alguna cosa que he hecho.
Cuando tengo "mala suerte," suele sucederme por
Cosas que estan fuera de me control.
Alguna cosa que he hecho.
NA
PO
NO
NA
PO
NO
Cuando las gentes tienen, "buena suerte," suele sucederles
Por cosas que estan fuera de su control.
Porque ellas han hecho alguna cosa.
Cuando las gentes tienen, "mala suerte," suele sucederles
Por cosas que estan fuera de su control.
Porque ellas han hecho alguna cosa.
3. PA Si yo eludo accidentes de traficos, probablemente es porque
Las autopistas ya estan mejores planeadas con seguridad.
Yo conduzco con cuidado.
Si yo estoy en accidentes de traficos, probablemente es porque
Las autopistas no eran planeadas con seguridad.
No conduzco siempre con cuidado.
NA
PO Si las gentes eluden accidentes de traficos, probablemente es
porque
Las autopistas ya estan mejores planeadas con seguridad.
Conducen con cuidado.
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CONDITIONS
ITEMS
A. PA Si yo reclbi buenas notas en la oo^ i
Estudie^ much.
escuela, probablemente era porque
Las reglas de dar notas eran muy fa^cilesSi yo recibi malas notas en 1^
^dciie .
No estudie' bastan^e P^°bablemente fue porque
Las reglas de dar notas eran muy difrcil.
pjob:bi:::ntr:r:ojqSf - --eia.
Ellos estudian bastante.
Las reglas de dar notas son fbelles.
No^::^L?ba"Ln::f'^^ probablemente es porque
Las reglas de dar notas son dificiles.
Cuando las cosas me van bien, normalmente es porqueLa suerte esta conmigo. ^ ^
Las he planeado con tiempo.
Cuarido las cosas no me van bien, normalmente es porqueLa suerte no estaba conmigo.
P
No las he planeado con tiempo.
Cuando las cosas les van bien a lac cr^^f^^
La suerte est^ con eUos ^
normalmente es porque
Han planeado con tiempo.
Cuando las cosas no les van bien a las gentes, normalmente es
La suerte estaba con ellos.
No han planeado con tiempo.
6. PA Cuando era nino, me premiaban porque
Generalmente, me comportaba bien.
Mis padres se sentian obligados a premiarme.
Cuando era nino estabe castigado porque
Generalmente, me comportaba bien.
Mis padres se sentian obligados a castigarme.
NA
PO
NO
5. PA
NA
PO
NO
NA
PO
NO
A los ninos se les premian porque
Generalmente, se comportan bien.
Los padres se sienten obligados a premiarles.
A los ninos se les castigan porque
Generalmente, no se comportan bien.
Los padres se sienten obligados a discipoinarles
.
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CONDITIONS
ITEMS
7. PA
Dealguna manera soy merecedora de ellos.
i^t: aiguna manera no soy merecedor de ellos.
es IIUIT""' P--ados. probable.ente
Otras gentes noraalmente le tratan bienDe alguna manera es merecedora de ello
es porquT'" ^° '^'^^ premiados, probablemente
Otras gentes normalmente s6lo se interesan por si mismoDe alguna manera no es merecedora de ello.
8. PA Cuando beneficios, tipicamente es porque
He hecho las cosas correctas.
Es debido a mi buena suerte.
Cuando sufro, tipicamente es porque
He hecho las cosas incorrectas.
Debido a mi mala suerte.
NA
PO
NO
NA
PO
NO
9. PA
Cuando las gnetes reciben beneficios, tipicamente es porquenan hecho cosas correctas.
Es devido a su buena suerte
Cuando las gentes sufren, tipicamente es porque
Han hecho las cosas incorrectas.
Es dlbido a su mala suerte.
Cuando me suceden cosas buenas, tipicamente es porque
La suerte estabe conmigo.
Las he trabajado para obtenerlas.
Cuando las cosas no me van bien, normalmente es porque
La suerte no estabe conmigo.
No las he planeado con tiempo.
Cuando las cosas les van bien a las gentes. normalmente es porque
La suerte esta con ellas.
Han planeado con tiempo.
Cuando las cosas no les van bien a las gentes, normalmente es
porque
La suerte no esta con ellas.
No han planeado con tiempo.
10. PA Si yo recibo afecto, probablemente es porque
Usualmente las gentes son muy carinbsas.
Yo he dado afecto.
Si no recibo afecto, probablemente es porque
Usualmente otras gentes no son carinbsas.
Yo no he dado afecto.
NA
PQ
NO
NA
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CONDITIONS •
ITEMS
PO
NO
11. PA
NA
PO
NO
Usualmente otras gentes son cari^Tosas. ^
^
alios han dado afecto.
Si las gentes no recibei afecto, probablement. es porqueUsualmente otras gentes no son carin'osas.Mlos no han dado afecto.
Si consigo lo que deseo, norraalmente es porqueHe sido justo con otras personas.
El conseguir lo que deseo es cuestion de buena suerte.Si no consigo lo que deseo, normalmente es porqueNo he sido justi con otras personas.
La falta de conseguir lo que deseo es cuestion de mala suerte,
^'Han'sfdoT
consiguen lo que desean, probablemente es porque.Han sido justo con otras personas.
El conseguir lo que desean es una cuestio^n de buena suerte
porque
^^""^^^ consiguen lo que desean, probablemente es
No han sido justo con otras personas.
El conseguir lo que desean es una cuestion de buena suerte.
12. PA Si soy tratado con consideracio'n, probablemente es porque
He sido considerado con las demas.
Las gentes tiended a preocuparse por los dem^s.
Si no soy tratado con consideracion, probablemente es porqueNo he sido considerado con las demas.
Las gentes teinden a preocuparse solamente por ellos.
PO Si las gentes son tratadas con consideracion, probablemente
es porque
Ellos han sido considerados con los demas.
La gentes tiended a preocuparse por los demas.
Si las gentes no son tratadas con consideracion, probablemente
es porque
Ellos no han sido considerados con los demas.
Las gentes tienden a preocuparse solamente por ellos mismos.
NA
NO
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APPENDIX IVA
ENGLISH VERSION ITEMS FOR "ACTUAL- AND PERCEIVED
BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
ALTHOUGH OUR ANSWERS ON THIS QUESTIONNAIRE ARE ANONYMOUSWi WOUI.D LIKE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION.
1. What is your age?
ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS MARK "X" BESIDE THE CORRECT ANSWER.
2. What Is your sex? Male Female
3. Wl,en you were crowing up. what was the annual income of your household?
Less thon $4,000 per year
$4,000 to $7,999 per year
$8,000 Lo $11,999 per year
$12,000 to $15,999 per year
$16,000 or more per year.
"come
='"".:'™"y'= "ith the "average" American family'sinco , oo you see it as
. . ,
.
Much below average
SomexdiaL beloi^ average
Average
Somewhat above average
Much above average.
5. Estimate tlie amount of education your father had.
(Mark an "X" beside the highest level
he completed.)
Completed elementary school
Some high school
Completed high school
.
Some college
Completed college
Post-graduate degree
I do not know.
6. Compared to the "average" male in America, how would you rate your
father's educational level?
Much below average
Somewhat below average
Average
Somewhat above average
Much above average
I do not know.
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7. Estimate the amount of education your mother had.
(Mark an "X" beside the highest level
n 1 , completed.")Completed elementary school
Some high school
Completed high school
Some college
Completed college
.
Post-graduate degree
I do not know.
$::r::^.".fL:;!:"!!!;' f™^^? ^-i-. ...r, ,ou .ateyour mother's educational level?
Much below average
Somewhat below average
Average
Somewhat above average
Much above average
I do not know.
9. What is your father's occupation?
10. What is the amount of your education?
(Mark an "X" beside the highest level
- ,
you have completed.)
_
Completed elementary school
Some high school
Completed high school
Some college
Completed college
_
Post-graduate degree
Other (Please specify)
:
11. Compared to the "average" person of your own age and sex in America,how would you rate your educational level?
Much below average
Somewhat below average
Average
Somewhat above average
Much above average.
12. Compared to the "average" person, how would you rate yourself on
the number of opportunities you have had to live a satisfying life?
°iore opportunities than the "average" person
Somewhat more opportunities than the "average" person
About the same number of opportunities as the "average" person
Somewhat fewer opportunities than the "average" person
^ny fewer opportunities than the "average" person.
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APPENDIX IVB
SPANISH VERSION ITEMS FOR "ACTUAL" AND PERCEIVED
BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
AUNQUE SUS RESPUESTAS EN ESTE QUESTIONARIO SON ANONIMASNOS GUSTARIA SABER LA SIGUIENTE INFORMACION
1. Cuantos anos tiene ud.?
COmcTr'™"'' ™- ™^ * ""0 °E LA RESPUESTA
2. Sexo; hombre ^ •iiuuiuLt;
^ mujer
Menos de $4,000 al ano
$4,000 a $7999 al ano
$8,000 a $11,999 al ano
$12,000 a $15,999 al ano
$15,000 o ma's al ano.
Comparando los ingresos en su familia con la familia "promedia"Americana, ud. lo ve como ...
Muy debajo del promedio
.
Algo debajo del promedio
Promedio
Also mas alto del promedio
Mucho mas alto del promedio.
5. Calcule ud. cuanta educacion ha tenido su padre. (Ponga una "X" alado del nivel mas alto que ha terminado.)
Termino la escuela primaria
Algo de la escuela secundaria
Termino la escuela secundaria
Algo de la universidad
Termino la universidad
Titulo post-graduado
No lo se.
6. En comparasion ai hombre "promedio" en los Estados Unidos, como
calcularia el nivel de educacion de su padre?
Muy debajo del promedio
Algo debajo del promedio
Promedio
Algo mas alto del promedio
Mucho mas alto del promedio
No lo se.
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7. Calcule ud. cuanta educacion ha f^^n-r^^
a lado del ni.el
.as aUo Z^lATlt^llZlTo:, ""^
Terminado la escuela primaria
_
Algo de la escuela secundaria
Terminada la escuela secundaria
_
Algo de la universidad
—
.
Terminada la universidad
Titulo post-graduado
No lo se.
8. En comparasion a la muier "Drmnpri-ia ^ i
co^ ealcularia el nlv^el de'':d:c1ci;„ de ITIZT
Muy debajo del promedio
Algo debajo del promedio
.
Promedio
Algo mas alto del promedio
Mucho mas alto del promedio
No lo se.
9. Cual es la ocupacion de su padre?
10. Cuinta educacl6n ha tenido ud.? (Ponea una "y" ni i ^\ ~~~7
mas alto que ha terminado." ^ ^ ^^'^^ ^^^^^
Terrainado la escuela primaria
Algo de la escuela secundaria
.
Terminado la escuela secundaria
Algo de la universidad
.
Terrainado la universidad
Titulo post-graduado
.
Otvo (Por favor espescifique
en ^o^?^^!^°" n
"promedia" de su propia edad y sexol s Estados Unidos como calcularia su invel de educaci6n?
Muy debajo del promedio
Algo debajo del promedio
Promedio
Algo mas alto del promedio
Mucho mas alto del promedio.
12. En comparasion a la persona "promedia" como calcularra el numerode oportunidades que ud. ha tenido para tener una vida satisfecha?
Nuchas mas oportunidades que la persona "promedia."
Algunas mas oportunidades que la persona "promedia."
Mas o menos igualdad de oportunidades que la persona "promedia.
Algunas oportunidades menos que la persona "promedia."
Muchos menos oportunidades que la persona "promedia."
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APPENDIX V
RANDOM ASSIGNMENT WITHOUT REPLACEMENT OF ITEM THEMESTO CONDITIONS AND QUESTIONNAIRE FoS^
PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD ITEMS
Type of Outcome LOCUS OF CAUSALITY ITEMS
Type of Outcome
J+ j- 1T4-UT U-
+
10 2 12 8 6 1 9 11
A 9 1 4 5 2 4 5 12
7 6 11
7 3 8 10
I
1 7 6 3 12 9 1 2
T
E
B 11 8 9 10 5 10 7 4
M 5 4 2 12 8 11 6 3
F
0
12 10 5 6 6 1 9 11
R
M
C 2 11 8 9 2 4 5 12
S 4 3 1 7 7 3 8 10
6 5 11 1 12 9 1 2
D 3 9 7 4 5 10 7 4
8 12 10 2 8 11 6 3
*These assignments are for both Actor and Observer questionnaires
Note: These numbers represent the item theme numbers in Appendices
IIA, IIB, IIIA, and IIIB.
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APPENDIX VIIA
ENGLISH VERSION OF GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
LIFE EXPERIENCES QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire is part of an extensive investigation of
people's personal experiences. Generally, the study is concerned
with the relationship between what people do and what happens as a
result of their actions. Before pursuing
.ore specific questions, we
have to understand the usefulness of the items in our questionnaire
You can help us by reading the inr tractions very carefully,
and answering the items as frankly a. possible. It is the honesty of
your answers with which we are concerned. There are no "right" or
"wrong" answers; we only want to know what you have observed to be
generally true.
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OF INSTRUCTIONSFOR PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD ITEMS
On the following Dappc; von
in which you already have or r ^7-1 ^^^^^^P^^^^^ of situations
stateTnents arTT^^read seve^fl ^• yourself. Some of the
clearly. ^^^^""^^ to make sure you understand them
After you understand the sta^f>TnAr>^ r^^^beneath that statement. Place an '?"T ^^ ^ ""^"^^^^ ^^'^
what you believe is likely to be true.
"^^""^ ''^^''^ indicates
EXAMPLE
When I a™ trusting of others, 1 usually get along well with the..
EXTREMELY GENERALLY SOMEWHAT VoMSSSf" SEs'
TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
Or, Instead you may answer:
EXTREMELY GENERALLY ^^^^ J^^^' ^^^^f ^^^^^TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
Please base your answers on what you think is true for yourself
thefsho^
-Perience. By basing your answers on your ovn. e^f7I~
^aoLn ti^^'
accurate. People have more information a^Sut whath ppe s o themselves than what happens to other people.
think
iinportant that your answers do not indicate what youshould happen, but rather what you think is ^t likely to occur.
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THESE INSTRUCTIONS
PLEASE DIRECT THEM TO THE PERSON ADMINISTERING THIS
QUESTIONNAIRE.
IF YOU HAVE NO QUESTIONS, TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE AND BEGIN.
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occur to°;o:!\ftars"a:e"oc::^^:r",^,?rtS ^-
In some ways similar to thoL in\tl statements are
they are aLo In s^L ^ays different.'
-rU an "X" beside tL enlins whUh Jo^i^ Cts^
-^e/"""^"'
EXAMPLE
When I do not get along well with people, it is probably because
^ of the way that I treat them.
.
they haven't been very kind to me.
Or, instead, you may answer:
—
of the way that I treat them.
X they haven't been very kind to me.
Although you may not fully agree with either ending that is pro-
vided, just mark the one which you think is better or more likely to betrue. Do not indicate what you think "should" be true," but rather whatyou think is most likely to be true.
yourself
As in Part A, base your choices on what you think happens to
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THESE INSTRUCTIONS, PLEASE
DIRECT THEM TO THE PERSON ADMINISTERING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.
IF YOU aWE NO QUESTIONS, TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE AND BEGIN.
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beneath th^rsCte^n^^^^J^efL^'x-^r^he^'^^^ '^Tt '° ^^^^
what you believe is likely ?o be trl. "''K^ates
EXAMPLE
X
EXTREMELY GENERALLY SOMEW.IAT s5mSat' GeSaH?^ SffiECYTRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
Or, instead, you may answer:
EXTREMELY GENERALLY SOMEWHAT SOMETOAT ' GiSXilY' EXTREMELYTRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
'
Please base your answer on what you think is true for otherpeople. By basing your answers on other people's experiences,"^
answers should be n,ore accurate. We can be more objective about whathappens to other people than what happens to ourselves.
.u- 1
^"^"^^ important that your answers do not indicate what youthink should happen, but rather what you think is most likely to occur.
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THESE INSTRUCTIONS, PLEASE
DIRECT THEM TO THE PERSON ADMINISTERING THIS QUESTIONNNAIRE.
IF YOU HAVE NO QUESTIONS, TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE AND BEGIN.
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ways similar t^ThSit In thp^rl statements are In some
also i„ some ways dl?ferenu ""^ »==y
two ending^: ^f^vld^S 'IJr"' ^"""-"^ °- °f the
an "X" .eflde the Ir^t^L ^
EXAMPLE
When^peopJe do not get along well with others, it is probably
^ °- the way they treat the others.
the others were initially unkind to them.
Or, instead, you may answer:
of the way they treat the others.
X the others were initially unkind to them.
Although you may not fully agree with either ending that isprovided, just mark the one which you think is better or more likelv tobe true. Do not indicate what you think "should" be true, but ratl^r
what you think is most likely to be true.
As in Part A, base your choices on what you think happens to
other people. ^
IF YOU HAVE AITY QUESTIONS ABOUT THESE INSTRUCTIONS, PLEASE
DIRECT THEM TO THE PERSON ADMINISTERING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.
IF YOU HAVE NO QUESTIONS, TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE AND BEGIN.
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SPANISH VERSION OF GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
QUESTIONARIO DE LAS EXPERIENCIAS DE LA VIDA
Este questlonarlo es una parte de una investigacio'n e«ensiva
de las experlenclas personales de las gentes. Gencralmente. el
estudlo se trata de las cosas que pasan a las gentes. Antes de segulr
con las preguntas ma's especlflcas, hay que entender que los elementos
en los questionarios son muy importantes.
Ud. puede ayudarnos al leer las instructiones cuidadosamente y
al responder lo m^s francamente posible. Es la sinceridad de sus
respuestas lo que realn^ente nos importa. No hay respuestas "correctas"
ni "incorrectas;" solamente queremos saber lo que ud. ha observado como
verdad en general.
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por sf mls^o. A vecefhay^ue iSr^r'f ".""^ ^""^ experlr»entar
poder entenderlas major ^ declaraciones varlas veces para
que i„diq,,,e lo .ejor quo ud. cree que prcbabi::ente L wrdad!
EJEMPLO
Cuando confio en los dems, nonaalmente me llevo bi
: X ; .
SUMAMENTE GENEPvAL-
~ALGO
*
VERDAD MENTE VERDE
VERBAD
en CO alios,
ALGO
FALSO
0, en caiabio ud. puede responder;
GENEPA.L- SUMAMENTE
MENTE FALSO
FALSO
SUMAMENTE
VERDAD
GENERAL-
MENTE
VERDAD
ALGO
VERDAD
ALGO
FALSO
GENERAL-
MENTE
FALSO
SUMAMENTE
FALSO
Por favor base sus respuestas en lo que ud. cree que es verdadpara udj_isino en sus propias experiencias
. Al basar sus respuestas
en sus propxas experiencias estas deben ser mas precisas. Las gentestxenes mas informacion sobre lo que les pasa a ellos mismos que a loque le pasa a los demas.
Tarablen es importante que sus respuestas no indlquen lo que ud
cree que debe pasar. Sino que lo que ud. cree que tiene mas probabi lidades
de suceder.
SI UD. TIENE ALGUNA PREGUNTA SOBRE ESTAS INSTRUCCIONES
, POR FAVOR
DIRIGASE A LA PERSONA QUE ESTA A CARGO DE ESTE QUESTIONARIO
.
SI NO MY PREGUNTAS, PASE A LA PAGINA SIGUINETE Y COMIENCE A
CONTESTAR.
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que usted habia visto en seccxones anteriores.
"iferentes a las
desp.es de cade deaL'L;"^:^ "^ \ r:L'"^"-al"^:ar/l"r^"^'que usted cree que es la verdadera. ^""^^^
EJEMPLO
Cuando no me llevo bien con las gentes. probabletnente es por
^ La forma que yo les trato.
ellos no ban sido muy amables conmigo.
0, en cambio usted puede contestar
La forma que yo les trato a ellos.
X
—
Que ellos no ban sido muy amables conmigo.
Aunque usteddno este completamente de acuerdo con ninguna de las
^-la de las que usted crea que esta mas cerca de ser la verd.dpr. Noindique lo que usted cree que "debe'' ser la verdad, s ino "ii^di^I^ lo quese aproxima a la verdad. ^
Como en la parte A, base las respuestas en lo que usted pienseque le puede ocurrir a usted mismo.
SI TIENE ALGUNA PREGUNTA SOBRE ESTAS INSTRUCCIONES, POR FAVOR
PREGUNTE A LA PERSONA QUE ESTA ENCARGADA DE ESTE TRABAJO.
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En las paginas siguientes ud. va a encontrar rlpc---,-^.-!
situaciones en las cuales las gentes ^ han experlLnta "o Lcuales van a experimentar por si mismJl. A veces hav c-^- leer la'declaraciones varias veces para poder entenderlL
espacxo que indique lo .ejor que ud. cree que prob^bfL^^^e es ::rdad.
EJEMPLO
enof^^'i^'^^'^K-'^^^"^^ general.-:ate es porqueiios se llevan bien entre si h ^
X
SUMAMENTE
VERDAD
GENERAL-
MENTE
VERDAD
ALGO
VERDAD
0, en cambio ud. puede responder
ALGO
FALSO
GE:riX\L- SUMAMENTE
MZ:;-E FALSO
FAISO
SUMAMENTE
VERDAD
genI':ral-
MENTE
VERDAD
ALGO
VERDAD
ALGO
FALSO
GENU„-\L-
MEl.TE
FALSO
SUMAl^lENTE
FALSO
Por favor base la respuesta sobre lo que ud. cree que es verdadpara los_depas. Al basar las respuestas en las experier.cias de los demas
sus respuestas deben ser mas precisas. Nosotros podemos ser raas objetivos
sobre lo que pasa a los demas que sobre lo que nos pasa = nosotros mismos.
Tambien es importante que las respuestas no indie. en lo que ud.
cree que debe pasar, sino lo que ud. cree que tiene mas :":-:babilidades
de suceder. '
SI UD. TIENE ALGUNA PREGUNTA SOBRE ESTAS INSTRUCT ^NES , POR
FAVOR DIRIGASE A LA PERSONA QUE ESTA A CARGO DE ESTE QUESIIONARIO.
SI NO HAY PREGUNTAS, PASE A LA PAGINA SIGUIENTE : -QMIENCE A
CONTESTAR.
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les sue^ o^ur^ffrL'lentes" sobre los eventos que
estarTiSIaraciones son en a?^™» f'"" " ^""argo
despues de cada dec?:^':^-^^:^ ^ \ rSL'-X-'al^Udrd'^'^''""que usted cree que es la verdadera. "^"^^
EJEM'LO
Cuando las gentes no se llevan bien unas con otras, probable.ente
__X La forma en que tratan a los deitias.
demas no ban sido amables con ellos,
0, en cambio puede contestar
La forma en que tratan a los den/s.
X
—
Que los dema's no ban sido amables con ellos.
1.. "t^^-^^
"° ^^^^ completamente de acuerdo con ninguna delas respuestas finales que se le ha dado, lo que puede hacer es marcarsolo^ de las que usted crea que esta mas cerca de ser la verdadera.No indique lo que usted cree que "debe" ser la verdad, sino indiqurioque se aproxima a la verdad.
Como in la parte A, base sus respuestas en lo que usted creeque le puede ocurrir a las gentes.
SI TIENE ALGUNA PREGUNTA SOBRE ESTAS INSTRUCCIONES
, POR FAVOR
PREGUNTE A LA PERSONA QUE ESTA ENCARGADA DE ESTE TRABAJO.
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Footnotes
1.
-y be caned actual usri^e!' ?r/:r'ariJ9:9rf"' T^lsoldiers expressed dissatisfaction when S;rr;asbetween what they thought thpv .Ur. discrepancy
received. Heider's (lIsR) ^aL ^^
''^"'''^
^^^^^ actually
fer to nar-.T
^.^1958) b lance theory suggests that people pre-t pe ceive positive correlations between an individLl 'personal characteristics (e.g., virtue) and ^he naturl of h: out-
TuTt.lTrZL^^^^^^^ --^P^ °f ••distr°buti:e
Mon^i
^^61) maintains that people work toward a propor-tional relationship between investments and outcomes Adam's QQfiS^equity theory claims that people not only ^'actually' ' (try to?
^
"Sura!sr°'''^'^
relationship betLen invesLents'an ^ut-
tr";;rc:L:'^?tl^
-IIT.''^'''
relationship in order


